Neuroimagiologia e avaliação de responsabilidade

Auteurs-es

  • Nicole A. Vincent In mid-2007 I obtained my PhD in philosophy of tort law from the University of Adelaide in South Australia, with a dissertation entitled “Responsibility, Compensation and Accident Law Reform”. From late 2007 until early 2016, I was affiliated with the Philosophy Section at Technische Universiteit Delft in The Netherlands. Initially, as a postdoc working on Dr Gert-Jan Lokhorst’s neurolaw research project entitled “The Brain and The Law”; and then as chief investigator of the international research project “Enhancing Responsibility: the effects of cognitive enhancement on moral and legal responsibility”. From February 2011 until July 2013 I was a research fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia working on a project entitled “Reappraising the Capacitarian Foundation of Neurolaw”. From August 2013 until December 2016 I was an Associate Professor of Philosophy, Law, and Neuroscience at Georgia State University in Atlanta, GA, USA. In 2018 I joined the Faculty of Transdisciplinary Innovation at University of Technology Sydney (UTS) as Senior Lecturer. I am also an Honorary Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Macquarie University, and an Affiliate Member of its Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics.

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.5102/rbpp.v8i2.5629

Résumé

Poderiam evidências da neuroimagiologia nos ajudar a avaliar o grau de responsabilidade de uma pessoa por um crime que sabemos que ela cometeu? Este ensaio defende uma resposta afirmativa a essa questão. Uma série de típicas objeções a essa abordagem de alta tecnologia de avaliação da responsabilidade das pessoas é considerada e, depois, colocada de lado, mas também trago à luz e, em seguida, rejeito uma objeção original – uma objeção que somente é encontrada quando uma neuroimagem funcional (em vez de estrutural) é usada para aferir a responsabilidade das pessoas.

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Publié

2018-09-26

Numéro

Vol. 8 No. 2 (2018): Indução de comportamentos (neurolaw): direito, psicologia e neurociência

Rubrique

Artigos

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Comment citer

Neuroimagiologia e avaliação de responsabilidade. (2018). Revista Brasileira de Políticas Públicas, 8(2), 212-232. https://doi.org/10.5102/rbpp.v8i2.5629