MAPPING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION: AN INSTITUTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF ASIAN MODELS

Résumé

Public interest litigation (PIL) has become an important institutional response to corporate environmental harm across Asia, but comparative scholarship has not systematically examined how different models perform as mechanisms of accountability. This article addresses that gap by developing a three-dimensional framework based on deterrence, compensation, and transparency, and applying it to four PIL models across Asian jurisdictions: procuratorial PIL in China, judicially driven PIL in India, citizen suit PIL in the Philippines, and victim-led litigation in Japan. Using an institutional typology grounded in underlying design features, the analysis shows that each model produces a distinct accountability profile, and that none performs strongly across all three dimensions simultaneously. This pattern reflects an institutional trilemma. The conditions that support strong deterrence tend to limit transparency and compensation, while those that enhance compensation or transparency tend to constrain enforcement capacity. These trade-offs are not the result of implementation failures, but arise from the structure of the models themselves. The findings suggest that PIL should be assessed in terms of specific institutional designs and accountability dimensions, and they have implications for both comparative analysis and reform strategies.