

The Middle East: a [very] cautious evaluation *

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Abstract

This paper tries to present a cautious evaluation of the ongoing uprisings against the various authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, in countries so different as Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain, Yemen, Syria or Libya. It is noting the fact that millions of young participants in the uprisings are not organized politically, real secular political parties do not exist or are extremely weak, and therefore warns about the threat from the organized radical Islamist movements as potential winners in these internal conflicts. It also tries to explain why the “Turkish model” of the Islamist AKP government is not the best solution to this revolutionary wave. The paper mentions the importance of the new networking media in the development of the events but not as a sine qua non condition for success, as the anti-democratic Islamists also skillfully use it. Finally, it warns about the threat to the existing peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors and the possibility that the theocratic regime in Iran could be the real winner of the situation.

Keywords: Middle East and North Africa uprisings. Tunisia. Egypt. Bahrain. Yemen. Syria. Libya. Islamist movements. Turkish model. Iran. Media. Peace agreements.

1 Introduction

The present turmoil in the Arab world is the result of long standing root causes that were known and experts have predicted that they will lead to an explosive situation if not challenged by the Arab authoritarian regimes.

* Recebido em 21.03.2011.
Aprovado em 05.04.2011.

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The United Nations Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR) responded to a sense of urgency about the precariousness of Arab countries at the start of the new Millennium, and since 2002 brought independent prominent teams of Arab intellectuals and practitioners to analyze the three most pressing human development deficits in the region: knowledge, freedom, and women's empowerment. The 2003 report, *Building a Knowledge Society*, argued that only on the basis of truly knowledge-based societies can the Arab states flourish and achieve genuine human development. The third 2004 Report, *Towards Freedom in the Arab World*, focused on the paucity of freedom and good governance and the need for major reforms to tackle political restrictions that hinder human development in the Arab world.

The 2009 AHDR Report noted that seven years after the publication of the first Report, the region's fault lines as traced in that analysis may have deepened and the obstacles to human development in the region "lie in the fragility of the region's political, social, economic and environmental structures, in its lack of people centered development policies and in its vulnerability to outside intervention. Together, these characteristics undermine human security - the kind of material and moral foundation that secures lives, livelihoods and an acceptable quality of life for the majority." The Report found that "the rule of law indicator rates the Arab region as the second worst in the world" and warned that these states have become more of a "threat to human security instead of its chief support" and "human insecurity is palpable and present in the alienation of the region's rising cohort of unemployed youth and in the predicaments of its subordinated women, and dispossessed refugees" (ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2009).

The question was therefore not if but when and where this appalling situation of the Arab world will provoke a major popular reaction or a violent revolt.

2 The "Jasmine revolution" in Tunisia

Paradoxically, the first "revolution" happened in Tunisia, an Arab state with a sizeable and educated middle class, an economy which has a large industrial sec-

tor, with the highest level of per capita income among non-oil producing Arab states and explicit promotion and advancement of women. But the regime of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali became repressive and heavy-handed, accepted high level of unemployment rates and an exponential increase in the level of corruption, particularly centering on Ben Ali's wife, the Tarabelsi, family (MADDY-WEITZMAN, 2011).

What helped the radicalization of the masses, especially the young students and the middle classes, has been the publication by WikiLeaks of **cables** from the U.S. Embassy in Tunis between January 2006 and June 2009, adding substantial evidence to what people already knew concerning the corruption of the regime and the President's family (SHANE, 2011).

The diplomatic cables from 2008 showed American officials calling Tunisia "a troubled country" ruled by the "sclerotic" regime without a clear successor. Ben Ali was described in the cables as a very sick man preoccupied mainly with his cancer and playing with his grand children (remember the ailing Iranian Shah!).

The revolt was sparked by the self-immolation of the 26-year old student-turned street merchant, Mohammed Bouazizi. He became the symbol of the frustration of an entire generation of young Tunisians (SANINA, 2011).

There are indications that the Army's chief of Staff Gen. Rachid Ammar refused orders to shoot demonstrators and together with the Foreign Minister Kamel Morjane has guided events in the government, helping to usher Ben Ali from the scene.² A major Saudi journalist considers that what happened in Tunisia was "closer to a palace coup than a full-scale revolution" and Ben Ali's exile was the agreed settlement (ALHOMAYED, 2011).

The major political issue is now the strength and intentions of the Islamist Renaissance Movement. The organization says that it does not seek to monopolize

² "Exclusif: Comment Zine El Abidine Ben Ali a été débarqué," *Maghreb Intelligence*, January 18, 2011 at <<http://www.maghreb-intelligence.com/les-edits/648.html>>.

Islam in Tunisia, and recognizes the right of all Tunisians to practice their faith as they wish. Its leaders say that they are in favor of peaceful and gradual change toward a pluralistic and democratic system (AL SHAFEY, 2011).

The Renaissance Movement will face competition from Salafist Islamists from various backgrounds. Mohamed Ali Harrath, Secretary General of the Tunisian Islamic Front confirmed that the Front is considering proposals to form a political party and declared: “What we want, and hope from God Almighty, is that Islam will shine from Tunisia once again. In the past, this country was the base for spreading Islam into Africa, and the heart of Europe.” [He stressed that the Front has adopted a tolerant and moderate interpretation of Islam (AL SHAFEY, 2011).

Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the Renaissance Movement returning from exile, was welcomed by thousands of cheering Tunisians. **Ghannouchi** denies he wants to present himself to the presidential elections but claims seeking only his party’s participation at the municipal and parliamentary elections.

The assassination of a priest, anti-Semitic incidents, a series of Islamist attacks against prostitution houses and a huge wave of immigration have shaken the public (DAHMANI, 2011). Some 15,000 people demonstrated against Tunisia’s Islamist movement, calling for religious tolerance, ending weeks of relative calm in Tunisia’s capital (AMARA; VALDMANIS, 2011).

The Tunisian “Jasmine revolution” was the first case of relatively peaceful fall of an Arab authoritarian ruler and triggered a “domino effect” in the Arab world with huge consequences for Egypt, the most populated and important country, the leader of the Arab moderate camp.

3 Egypt

Indeed, the uprising began in Egypt as a spontaneous phenomenon triggered by the example of Tunisia and propelled by new media like **Facebook** and the potency of **Al Jazeera**’s broadcasts (SHADID, 2011).

After 18 days of revolt the young people of **Egypt** ousted President **Hosni Mubarak**, overturning the established order of the Arab world. The Egyptian Supreme Military Council released its “first” communiqué stating that the military would ensure a peaceful transition of Mubarak out of office, practically passing power into the hands of the armed forces, a “slow-motion coup - a return of the army from indirect to direct control.” (GOLDBERG, 2011; ABDELHADI, 2011).

3.1 The Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

The MB, and even the U.S. and some Western leaders are waging a reassuring campaign, claiming that the MB does not represent a real threat. For instance, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that “the term ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ is an umbrella term for a variety of movements, in the case of Egypt, a very heterogeneous group, largely secular, which has eschewed violence and has decried Al Qaeda as a perversion of Islam” (ROGIN, 2011).

The Muslim Brotherhood spokesman said it was merely a supporting player in the revolt: “We participated with everyone else and did not lead this or raise Islamic slogans so that it can be the revolution of everyone.” He said the MB will not field a candidate for president or seek a parliamentary majority in the expected elections (KIRKPATRICK, 2011a).

February 18, 2011 may be a turning point in Egyptian history: Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, prominent MB cleric in the world and one of the most famous Islamist thinkers returned to his homeland in triumph after 31 years in exile and delivered a Friday prayer sermon before a giant cheering crowd in Tahrir Square in Cairo. Qaradawi’s prominence exemplifies the peril and potential for the West. He supports the straight Islamist line: anti-American, anti-Western, wipe Israel off the map, foment Jihad, stone homosexuals (RUBIN, 2011).

Qaradawi praised the army and urged it to immediately release all political prisoners and to deliver on the promises of turning over power to a civil govern-

ment. He urged the young people who led the uprising to continue their revolution. (KIRKPATRICK, 2011b).

Ironically, **Wael Ghonim**, the young Google executive credited with helping ignite the popular uprising, was **blocked from getting on stage** by Qaradawi's guards. (CAIRO CROWD, 2011).

4 The Turkish model?

Pundits and leaders of Islamist movements in Egypt and Tunisia have hinted at the possibility that the Turkish Islamist AKP example is the best solution for the democratization of their countries.

However, AKP government's behavior are speaking for themselves. While Ankara was cautious not to applaud hastily the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia, it adopted a more aggressive, hypocritical, posture vis-à-vis Egypt. Prime Minister Erdogan has called on Mubarak "to relinquish power and secure a transition of power." By contrast, he has hastily met Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and agreed "to rally efforts regarding unrest in Egypt so to spare the people from any more suffering in the struggle to realize their demands, ambitions and will, hoping security and stability will return to Egypt." (TODAY 'S ZAMAN, 2011).

Turkish President Abdullah Gül has visited these days Iran to enhance the economic cooperation with the Tehran ayatollahs. "Erdogan in his last parliamentary group meeting empathized with the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq. Perfect! Now in line are the peoples of Iran, Syria, Sudan, Algeria, and Cyprus. Go for it!" proposed an opposition newspaper (AKTAR, 2011).

5 Libya

The revolt shaking Libya is the latest and most violent turn in the turmoil across the Arab world and poses the greatest threat in four decades to Colonel

Qaddafi's autocratic power. After a five days of uprising the opposition took control of Benghazi, its second-largest city and capital of the country's eastern province, and spread to the capital Tripoli. Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi the heir-apparent son blamed Islamic radicals and Libyans in exile for the uprising and threatened that "Libya is made up of tribes and clans and loyalties...and [T]here will be civil war." (KIRKPATRICK; EL-NAGGAR, 2011).

As Qaddafi's military units and security services crumble in the face of popular discontent he could decide to "fight to the last bullet" which suggests more horrific levels of violence and anarchy. The repercussions of change for Libya could be far greater than in Egypt and Tunisia with an amount of chaos that is larger than seen so far.

6 Bahrain

Unrest in Bahrain is putting the future of a key U.S. ally in doubt. Bahrain is positioned near the world's most important oil reserves, and its Sunni government has been seen as a reliable bulwark against nearby Shiite-led Iran. At the center of U.S. strategy there is the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet which patrols the Persian Gulf and Arabian and Red seas (BARNES, 2011).

If Iran perceives a situation where the U.S. would treat the king as it treated Mubarak, this would encourage Iran to increase its offensive subversion in Bahrain and possibly in eastern Saudi Arabia (NERIAH, 2011).

7 Syria

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, in a rare interview, said that "the protests in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen are ushering in a "new era" in the Middle East, and that Arab rulers would need to do more to accommodate their people's rising political and economic aspirations." He promised to push for more political, economic and administrative reforms and claimed that while Syria has more difficult circu-

mstances than most of the Arab countries it is still stable and “people do not go into an uprising.” (INTERVIEW..., 2011).

Indeed, the calls on Facebook for an Egypt-style uprising in Syria did not succeed. However, an estimated 1,500 people took to the streets of Damascus on February 17, after a shopkeeper’s son was allegedly beaten by police, in an unprecedented spontaneous demonstration (AL-MAKHADHI, 2011).

The Syrian Sunnis suffered under the brutal hand of the minority Alawi regime of the Assads. The memory of the brutal repression of the Muslim Brothers in Hama back in the 1980s which killed 20,000 people make more difficult an uprising in Syria (YOUSSEF, 2011).

8 Iran

A positive development for the Middle East could be if events in Arab countries provoke a revitalization of the reformist uprising in Iran.

Indeed, tens of thousands of Iranians took to the streets of Tehran on February 14 to demonstrate solidarity with Egyptian and Tunisian protesters, ignoring threats from the government. But the Iranian police responded to the protesters with beatings, arrests, tear gas, and other brutal measures and unlike in Egypt, the Iranian regime has for the moment the upper-hand in the situation with its forces clearly willing to use maximum brutality. A huge majority of Iranian lawmakers even called for opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi to face the death penalty for fomenting unrest (FASSIHI, 2011).

The Iranian leadership considers events in Tunisia and Egypt as an anti-American movement playing to their advantage. The daily *Keyhan* predicted that the fall of Mubarak’s regime will deal a major blow to the regional status of the U.S. while Iran’s status will likely strengthen and it will now take charge of the developments in the Middle East (ZEMMIT, 2011).

9 Where are the Jihadists?

Jihadists and radical Islamists closely followed the dramatic events in Tunisia, seen as an opportunity to promote their cause. Prominent cleric Abu Basir Al-Tartusi maintained that the events in Tunisia were a “popular Islamic intifada.” In an audio message, AQIM leader ‘Abd Al-Wadud hailed ‘uprising’ in Tunisia and Algeria and called on Tunisians to send their sons to train with the Al-Qaeda in the Arab peninsula (AQAP) (GREEN, 2011).

The Egyptian Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya has renewed its activities, intends to establish a political party but will not resume violent operations. Senior Al-Gama’a official Safwat ‘Abd Al-Ghani said the organization is being restructured and will renew its da’wa activities, especially in mosques (AL-GAMA’A..., 2011).

In the Al-Qaeda leadership’s first public response to the events in Egypt, Thirwat Salah Shehatah, a senior Al-Qaeda commander and one of Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s deputies in the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) group, issued a communiqué praising the Egyptian people and calling for President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster. According to the Saudi *Asharq Al-Awsat*, Shehata’s “statement was issued from Tehran where Shehata is currently residing” (JOSCELYN, 2011).

It is of note that neither Osama Bin Laden nor his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri have expressed themselves in the media since the beginning of the uprising in Tunisia.

10 United States policy in the Middle East

Obama’s administration’s handling of the crisis and its abrupt rebuke of President Mubarak, America’s most important Middle Eastern ally, while in June 2009 Obama didn’t support the Iranian masses which rose against the theocratic regime, projected a very negative U.S. image to other Arab leaders and raised serious concerns in Israel too.

Washington endorsed the uprising in Tunisia and offered the new government “whatever support is appropriate and requested” in conducting a nationwide

election. It supports efforts to free political prisoners, end media restrictions and lift bans on political parties (DARAGAH, 2011).

Some analysts thought the reaction of the United States to what happened in Tunisia came too late and had difficulty in handling a very fast moving situation. A lot of people perceive the United States to have been very tentative in the way that it has handled the Egyptian potato: it supported the protesters' rights but people in the region were clamoring for immediate departure of Mubarak before it is too late (FOUKARA, 2011).

The administration has succeeded to press the military not to open fire on the demonstrators and getting Mubarak to say that he won't stand again. However, they always seemed to be reacting to events rather than shaping them. The United States' fear, like in Iran, is that the opposition might radicalize (TRANSCRIPT..., 2011).

Senior Saudi officials have expressed displeasure that Obama has allowed the protests in Bahrain to continue, and even grow, by espousing political and economic reforms in the region (TRANSCRIPT..., 2011).

11 Israel

Israel sees with great apprehension the events developing in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and beyond. Not that the Israeli leaders and people would not be happy to acclaim democratic regimes in these countries but they are deeply concerned about what these events mean for the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and the stability of the region.

The Muslim Brotherhood did not call yet for outright abrogation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, however, Dr. Ayman Nur, a liberal member of the opposition and leader of the Egyptian Tomorrow Party, who is planning to seek candidacy in the presidential elections, told Egyptian radio "the Camp David accord is over". His remarks contradicted the Egyptian military's statement on reassuring its international allies that there would be no break in its peace deal with Israel (HAARETZ, 2011).

12 A [very] cautious evaluation

At this stage of the turmoil, violence, uprisings and possibly revolution in the Middle East, in countries so different as Egypt and Bahrain, Iran or Libya, it is very difficult to make an intelligent evaluation of the situation.

As the millions of young participants in the uprisings in the various Arab countries are not organized politically, real secular political parties do not exist or are extremely weak, this paper analyzes mainly the threat from Islamist movements active for a long time clandestinely on the ground or in exile.

However, some important observations can be presented on the background of what is known of the recent history of the region, the forces at work and the attentive analysis of the events as they appear on visual media (TV and Internet), the statements of the actors involved and the intentions carefully buried in slogans.

Those in the West which are sure “this is not 1979, and Egypt’s Facebook-adept youth are not lining up behind the Muslim Brotherhood, itself scarcely a band of fanatics,” (COHEN, 2011) are not aware how effectively the same modern tools are used by the Islamists and the al-Qaeda networks.

Experts have stressed the importance of the new media (Internet, Facebook, Twitter, the cell phones) in the explosion of the uprisings. One such Swiss expert, Patrick Haenni, has noted that social media is the breeding ground for a new activism, while the discourse in this “young globalised culture” is no longer ideological or even Islamist, but a simple political platform focused on human rights, pluralism and democracy.³

Haenni argued that at the end of 2004 blogs by Muslim Brotherhood supporters managed to help open this non-transparent organization to an activism drawing on the culture and values of the internet. There was then a switch from the

³ See interview with Patrick Haenni, a Swiss field researcher, in Tunisia for the International Crisis Group: Frederic Burnand “Facebook revolutionaries outflank Arab regimes,” *swissinfo.ch*, January 31, 2011.

blog to Facebook, and these young MB supporters opened to the rest of the world, a lot more so than blogs ever did.

Actually, every revolution or upheaval has had its own media for the propagation of its ideology, the indoctrination and motivation of its supporters.

It should be remembered that the Ayatollah Khomeini fueled his Islamist revolution in Iran by disseminating from abroad hundreds of thousands of audio cassettes with his sermons against Shah's regime. When the U.S. destroyed the Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, the radical Islamists websites decided to disseminate the videos and CD-ROMs containing the ideological material and training manuals free of charge, in order to spread the flame of the Jihadist revolution to the "future young mujahedeen" around the globe.

The wave of protests in the Arab world has highlighted the power of Al-Jazeera, which has unparalleled influence in the Middle East. It has been banned from reporting on the unrest in Egypt, where its reporters have been targeted by Mubarak supporters. Governments in the region fear the station could be their undoing (GEBAUER; MUSHARBASH, 2011). At least 10 other satellite broadcasters in the region replaced their own programming with Al Jazeera's feed, foiling the Egyptian regime's efforts to prevent its citizens from watching the channel. Al Jazeera has emerged as a central player in the drama unfolding in the region (NISBET, 2011).

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to Jimmy Carter, even claimed that "the United States and the White House weren't all that central to the events in Egypt. They were precipitated to some extent by the intense and very skillful coverage given to the events by Al Jazeera. That really was very significant" (MaCNICOL, 2011).

However, the closure or jamming of the Internet, cellular phones and twitter had a different effect in Iran, where the Green Movement did not succeed to topple the regime or even the government of Ahmadinejad after the falsified July

2009 elections. It appears that the closure of all modern media in Libya did not prevent the successful uprising of the population, first in Benghazi and then in other provinces of the country, in spite of the bloody repression. And President Salah in Yemen or Bouteflika in Algeria are still in power.

Which means that cold blooded repression, the clever use of allied popular masses in counter-demonstrations, or the right tactical economic and social decisions by the rulers at the right moment are not less important than the media tools in use.

“Revolutions” in the Middle East in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s have turned in military authoritarian or dictatorial regimes, in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Sudan. The revolutionary Islamic Party in Iran has assassinated and in the best case imprisoned its moderate Islamists, liberal and communist partners and imposed a repressive theocratic regime. Free elections in the Palestinian Authority brought to power Hamas which killed its Fatah comrades in a bloody coup. Where Lebanon is today, after the popular uprising of 2005 against the Syrian occupation and the victory of 14 March forces in the 2009 elections?

In Egypt there are several possible scenarios: the best one would be if the military stabilize the situation and lead a slow democratization process; but the problem is the military could choose to stay in power indefinitely; the second is quick free elections leading to a secular/liberal coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood, but in the end the Islamists grab power by their sheer organizational skills and pitiless determination; the worst scenario would be a period of chaos and internal strife of the kind happening in Pakistan, including growing activity of salafist radicals.

At present in Egypt, the most important Arab country, and in Tunisia, the army is still the main power broker, with vested political and economic interests, and the will to preserve the stability of the state and its control of the regime.

Libya is probably the next Arab state whose leader will be ousted by a popular uprising, probably before the publication of this article. But the future of

this tribal society living for 40 years under an eccentric dictatorship is difficult to evaluate.

In case of an Islamization trend in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza will be strengthened and the balance in the West Bank, and possibly in Jordan, could also turn in favor of the Islamists.

The potential for progress towards peace between Israel and the Palestinians, or Syria, already limited will further diminish. Israel will be less likely to cede territory in light of the fragility of the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan.

In Bahrain, the main issue at stake is the sectarian divide between the Sunni ruling minority and the Shia majority. On the background of the Iraqi precedent, the Sunni rulers supported by their constituency and the neighboring Saudi Arabia and Gulf States will do everything in their power to keep the status-quo. Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. and UK navies and troops, could be an important prize for Iran, where some politicians already claimed it to be the 14th province of Iran.

In Yemen, the complex situation is influenced by the Sunni-Shia demographic division, the rebellion of the Shia Houthi tribes, the separatist forces in the South and the Sunni constituency of President Salah, who is still resisting the pressure of the opposition.

Egypt has stopped being an important regional power. With the disappearance of Mubarak and the beginning of an uncertain period without a leader, Egypt will be forced to turn inward in order to establish a new regime, rehabilitate the economy, and introduce far-reaching reforms. Therefore, regional leadership will go to Iran and Turkey – which is returning to play an active role the Middle East (MAZEL, 2001).

The insecurity in Libya may lead to the suspension of oil and gas exports from Libyan fields, which would have serious consequences for European markets. One scenario could be terrorist attacks on the country's energy infrastructure as in

Egypt, were gas pipelines in the Sinai linked to Jordan and Israel were attacked after the fall of Mubarak's regime (TAWIL, 2011).

The unrest in Bahrain may be of far greater importance to the oil market as clashes between Sunnis and Shia could spread to Saudi Arabia. Oil experts are concerned that a long period of instability in the Middle East is just beginning and will further drive up prices.

Robert Fisk, the known British Middle East correspondent, accuses always the West and Israel for the woes of the Arab world. But the journalist generally sympathetic to radical causes admits: "The truth, of course, is that the Arab world is so dysfunctional, sclerotic, corrupt, humiliated and ruthless...and so totally incapable of any social or political progress, that the chances of a series of working democracies emerging from the chaos of the Middle East stand at around zero per cent. No, on balance, I don't think the age of the Arab dictators is over" (FISK, 2011).

Only the future will say if a real democratization process is possible in the Middle East, as it happened in Eastern Europe and South America, and if peace and stability will accompany it.

O Oriente Médio: uma avaliação [muito] cautelosa

Resumo

Este artigo tenta apresentar uma avaliação cautelosa dos crescentes protestos contra os vários regimes autoritários no Oriente Médio e no norte da África, em países tão diferentes como Tunísia, Egito e Barein, Iêmen, Síria ou Líbia. Não impressiona o fato que milhões de jovens participantes nestes conflitos não sejam politicamente organizados, já que os partidos políticos verdadeiramente seculares não existem ou são extremamente fracos e por isso serve de alerta sobre a ameaça dos movimentos radicais islâmicos organizados saírem como potenciais vencedores nestes conflitos internos. O artigo também tenta explicar por que o "modelo

turco” do governo islâmico AKP não é a melhor solução para esta onda revolucionária. O texto demonstra a importância das novas redes sociais de mídia no desenrolar dos eventos, mas não como uma condição *sine qua non* para o sucesso, já que os Islâmicos anti-democratas também usam este tipo de mídia de forma muito habilidosa. Por último, o texto chama a atenção para a ameaça aos acordos de paz entre Israel e seus vizinhos árabes e a possibilidade de o regime teocrático no Irã sair como o real vencedor da situação.

Palavras-chave: Conflitos no Oriente Médio e Norte da África. Tunísia. Egito. Bahrrein. Iêmen. Síria. Líbia. Movimentos islâmicos. Modelo turco. Irã. Mídia. Acordos de paz.

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