

Violência Política em Tempo de Paz¹Marcelo Coutinho²**Abstract**

The purpose of this essay is to have a descriptive analysis of political violence in ten South American countries, between 2008 and 2011, from an exhaustive data systematics survey, collected from local newspapers, adopting a methodology well consolidated in this type of research. My hypothesis is that even distant from a war context and without the former bipolarity between capitalism and communism, violent conflicts in the region not only are frequent – despite the democratic advances and the relative economic stability – as they are results from a combination of social inequality and political exclusion. I argue that inclusive institutions, which are those that instead of repel they attract political opponents and actors, play a decisive role in significantly decreasing Political Violence Events (PVEs), especially in a continent marked by very heterogeneous societies. As theoretical approach, I use specific area studies associated with views called Neoweberian Historical Sociology, in particular classic authors such as Charles Tilly.

Keywords: Political Violence. Democracy. Violent Conflicts. Peacetime. South American Politics.

Resumo

O objetivo deste ensaio é realizar uma análise descritiva da violência política em dez países da América do Sul, entre 2008 e 2011, a partir de uma pesquisa sistemática exaustiva de dados coletados de jornais locais, a partir da adoção de uma metodologia bem consolidada para tipo de pesquisa. Minha hipótese é que, mesmo distante de um contexto de guerra e sem a bipolaridade entre o capitalismo e o comunismo, os conflitos violentos na região, não só são frequentes - apesar dos avanços democráticos e da relativa estabilidade econômica - uma vez que são resultados de uma combinação de desigualdade social e da exclusão política. Defendo que as instituições inclusivas, que são aquelas que, em vez de repelir, atraem os adversários políticos e atores, desempenham um papel decisivo na diminuição significativamente Violência Eventos Políticos (PVEs), especialmente em um continente marcado por sociedades muito heterogêneas. Como abordagem teórica, eu uso estudos de área específicos associados com vistas chamados neoweberianos da Sociologia Histórica, em especial os autores clássicos, como Charles Tilly.

Palavras-chave: Violência Política. Democracia. Conflitos violentos. Tempos de Paz. Política na América do Sul.

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1 Introduction

In “The Politics of Collective Violence” (2003), Charles Tilly suggests to those who suffer from euphoria to look at human rights reports in order to realize the condition of the world in this region is very distant from the ideal: “you will encounter vicious violence galore” (TILLY, 2003, p. 221).

According to the author, the collective violence holds a hazardous and coherent place on political contentious. It emerges from the power struggle, frequently alternated by periods of no violence or peace times. Understanding the causes of this violence could help decrease damages that human beings inflict one another.

Tilly is part of a thinking school known as newerberian historical sociology which includes other important authors as Skocpol (1979) and Giddens (1985). They assist us on understanding why the violence is so common in the competitive relationship between society and the State with relative autonomy. The State would aim not only to pacify the civil society but also to mobilize its resources. The monopoly of the force use would several times imply violent actions during order surveillance.

Radicalizing this conception shared by newerberian historical sociology, Mann doesn't realize the relationship between the State and the society as only a coercive competition between two major centers. He problematizes these relationships suggesting that there is no monopoly about the use of organized force and the State, in order to exercise its authority, relies on different grades of power sources simultaneously present in the society. States are not only a reflex of the needs, interests and values of the society which could cause discord and violence.

All of these studies already classic in the international literature offer an important starting point: State and society are not the same thing and they usually discord. My hypothesis is that social inequality and political exclusion increase the distance and the friction between the State and the society well as chances of more register of violence between social groups even in satisfactory economic conditions and without ideological polarities as seen during the Cold War.

The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the comprehension of the political violence in South American democracies in recent years, analyzing exhaustive data on this matter collected through surveys. Violence spots still persist in the region and others may erupt in

the future. “In our own violent time, advocates of non-violent political need all the help they can get.” (TILLY, 2003, p. 238)

Latin America is one of the regions in development with fewer conflicts. Although there has been a reduction of more serious crisis in the continent, about 15% of the conflicts in the world keep occurring in the region (HEIDELBERG, 2011). The research presented here brings data which allows clarifying origins, circumstances, consequences, victim profiles and stabilization measures adopted in political violence events in South American countries.

2 What is political violence and how to study it?

Although very common on scientific studies since 1960, the concept of political violence may seem strange at first moment. It's actually difficult to precisely separate this phenomenon from common social violence. Define the starting and ending point of political violence is equally complicated. For instance, does it include psychological coercion or institutional rupture as *coup d'état*?

Due to strictly operational and analytical matters, considering the purpose of the research, I define here political violence not only as conflicts between social groups or deaths caused by conflicts in the domestic sector, including the State itself (RUSSET, 1964), but also *the use of power in order to cause physical damages on political opponents*. In this way, I align this essay to most of the studies on this subject (GRAHAM; GURR, 1969; TILLY, 1978; DELLA PORTA; TARROW, 1986; DELLA PORTA, 1995; WILKINSON, 1986; GUICHAOUA, 2012).

As most part of the literature endorses, I've used local newspapers in order to gather data on registers of political violence and its victims (OHLEMACHER; RUCHT, 1992). Major newspapers with informations available on the internet from each country have been researched. A vast team of research assistants, in addition to reading newspapers in three in-between days of the week covering the period from 2008 to 2011, also has complemented it with other sources of data such as official documentaries, reports from non-government institutions, foreign newspapers, etc.

I've created the category Political Violence Events (PVEs) which can be defined as the unit of analysis of the study. Even with all attention, it was not always possible to complete the form which has been created to collect

data. Some information has been left out. Hence, it has been decided to not include the violent cases where it was uncertain. This way, it has been avoided the over representation of data and lack of truth, observing out of scope events.

Therefore, the number of registers should be in fact greater than what has been searched. It's important to highlight that since the beginning this essay didn't have the ambition to exhaust the chaos universe, but only observe a great representative number of the phenomenon in South America from a data network capable enough and already approved by the Academy.

As it has been a really deep work, it justifies surveying only four years mapped. But other reason explains the purpose or choosing 2008 to 2011. Besides being actual, this historical series occurred after the Union of South American Nations (Unasul), which main objective is the continent safety. Despite the global crisis, these have been years of economic development in the region with no great conflicts but political-institutional stability, in other words, times of peace.

It is worth mentioning the research has included cases related to drug trafficking as events of political violence because they have become one of the main challenges of the modern democracies. Excluding them would be an error. However, attempting to separate political violence from common violence, which is exclusively responsibility of the Police and less linked with politics, cases that were examined were only those which had direct participation of militaries during repression that could represent a threat to the State.

3 Extinct volcanoes or just dormant in South America?

The political story of Latin America is generally told as a legend of instabilities, conflicts and violence. This could be a correct view of the region in 200 years of independence. In fact, there have been several coups, riots, toppling presidents, suspension of civil and political rights, military repressions and some bloody civil wars. During authority periods, the violation of human rights has become shadowy based on thousands of people missing, tortured and killed.

Transitioning to the democracy in the 80's, the scenario began to improve. But still several episodes of violence could be observed, involving social groups and

the State itself. This disorder has even reached some stable democracies which were considered a model at that time, like Venezuela. It is worth mentioning, for example, the "Caracazo" in 1989 which has murdered millions of Venezuelan demonstrators, strongly repressed in the streets by the official safety forces. This has been another trauma which had consequences.

The truth is that there has not been a single year that this region didn't face political violence events (PVEs). Some events were more remarkable than others but all of them have some kind of battle on-field. From the Zapatista Movement in Chiapas, in 1994 to the Bolivian water and gas wars, in the first decade of XXI century, conflicts kept causing victims and change again the layout of the politics in Latin America. During these social movements "gobiernos de las calles" have aroused; governments more nationalists, with popular inspiration, socialist or simply more sensitive to social causes.

During past decades we could observe important institutional advances in this region. Most of today's existing schemes are democracies, with great or less pluralism, with civil and political freedom and regular electoral processes, which doesn't mean they are perfect democracies. The praetorian solutions for the political conflicts can no longer count on Latin America's support. There is what we call institutionalization of our democracies or at least a political stabilization in some countries which have learned to limit their conflicts within the State. We've lived what Anglo-Saxon scholars call "the only game in town".

Beyond a progressive dissemination of the rules of the democratic game, sensitive economic progress can still be observed. Following the global expansion in the last decade, Latin America has grown significantly. The dependency on commodities exportation never benefited a region as much as it did now with the valorization of these products in the international market. In many cases, it's already possible to talk about economic institutionalization. If liberal reforms in the 90's have brought problems, they were also responsible for many gains seen today, once lasting institutional foundations have been established. The combination between price stabilization, economic growth, focused politics and reductions of poverty and unemployment have caused a decrease on the social issues and its repercussion. Despite being observed also in wealthy countries, PVEs are correlated with underdevelopment and low rates of political inclusion.

There is a quieter environment in Latin Ameri-

ca which doesn't follow historical standards. We don't know if this is a new tendency or only an outlier. Apparently, conditions have changed, conflicts and the regional politics have cooled down. Yet we cannot talk about social peace, but we now negotiate instead of fight in a less pressured environment. The region now presents more stabilized societies which can be good for everyone. However, a less frequency and intensity of PVEs could mean they lost relevance? Are they extinct volcanos or just dormant ones?

Although the political and economic advances have taken power off of the PVEs, nothing can confirm that they cannot rise up again causing even more damages. This fact makes them important phenomenon to be permanently monitored and studied. Furthermore, there are many differences between the studied cases. There are countries more stable than others, countries where the advances are even slower and doubtful. If in volcanology there are few assured facts until today, the eruption of social nature is a difficult challenge to measure. However, EVPs have murdered more people in the past decades than volcanoes in entire Latin America.

Even the most institutionalized region, Chile, faces sorts of difficulties. Protests and strikes in the south of the country caused by the increase on the price of gas generated the 2011 first crisis, taking away safety and some lives. Moreover, Chile also faces some minor ethnic crisis, such as conflicts between populations originated from the andine indigenous arc.

Our capability of forecasting this kind of event is low. What we can and should do is register and analyzes these occurrences, such as mechanisms used to stabilize conflicts with special attention on the victims.

Identify, classify, categorize, compare, search for typologies and associations of the PVEs with other variables may assist to prevent deaths. As the volcanologists, tornado and storm hunters or seismologists, the PVEs observers look for its causes, its functioning and its effects differing only on its essence which is social science with all its particularities already well discussed. The more knowledge we gain benefiting from the scientific method the more rich a society becomes. And the more knowledge we have on phenomenon like EVPs probably the safer we will be in all neighborhoods.

The PVEs don't occur only in Latin America, but vary in severity, manifest in many ways and suffer changes as time passes. One of its current most problematic

manifestation is the conflict related to weapons and drug trafficking. Although these subjects are not in the red carpet of classic cases studied by the specialized literature on this matter, which in the beginning has been dedicated to the events with clear political guidelines, we can't deny how powerful the narcotics trafficking is nowadays in the societies. Conflicts between groups not well organized are the ones who compete against the State in the legitimate monopoly of the force. There are also several reports on incursions of these groups in political life within countries and transitional relationships. In trafficking, the political and social common violence can be confused.

As a main political change agent, PVEs are generally related to negative aspects. They cause deaths and injuries, destabilize the democracy, generate insecurity, intimidate capital investments and tourists, problematize the development, make regional integration more difficult and may even split nations. Due to the facts here mentioned, the UN and other international agents have been monitoring it. The more close countries are to each other, more chances of a possible contagion by PVEs. On the other hand, the regional integration is a stabilizer factor because it disseminates the conflict resolution (Peacekeeping). In this case, the example of stability in Brazil is valuable for the region although being a country which is more likely to also have EVPs.

The data analysis between 2008 and 2011 reveals a great number of PVEs. There have been a total of 916 in this period, almost one each two days in South America (refer to Table 1). The amount of PVEs was greater in the Andean countries, mostly in Colombia (238), Peru (217) and Venezuela (182). Having smaller population, Ecuador (46) and Bolivia (94) also presented high numbers. Chile (33) was in an intermediate range, although being a very stable democracy. Right next to it was Argentina (42), Brazil (35), and Paraguay (27). Uruguay (2) was the country with less PVEs. It's important to notice the tendency to increase annual registers of EVPs, reaching 271 cases in 2011. The year with fewer events was 2009 (167), when there was a major global economic crisis which demonstrates no direct association between economic environment and political violence.

When changing the unit from PVEs to victims, we may observe a surprising number (refer to Table 2). A total of 14.201 people have been directly affected by PVEs. From the total, 1.550 were murdered, 5.259 wounded, 417 are missing and 6.975 arrested. In terms of dea-

th, again Colombia (1.053) was the most violent country due to civil war and narcotics trafficking. In Peru, many people have died (280), in addition to the hundreds of wounded (1.367) and missing (202). The very high amount of people arrested in Chile (3.925) calls our attention, most students which show us a greater military repression. There have been also several arrests in Brazil (771) but due to the fact that the population in Brazil is much greater than in any of these countries, almost 200 million, we can see that the amount of political violence victims is smaller than in neighbor countries.

There has been at least one victim for each 25 thousands of South American inhabitants and from this one death for each 230 thousand people in the region. In other words, we may say there were 0,04 victims and 0,004 deaths per one thousand inhabitants. Not considering Brazil, a country which its size differs from the other in South America, there was one PVE victim per 12 thousands of inhabitants and one death for each 112 thousands of people, notably the relative number has increased to 0,08 victims and 0,009 deaths per thousand of inhabitants. In Brazil, there were only 0,005 victims and a not relevant amount of deaths caused by political violence per thousand of inhabitants, being much lower than the regional average, which demonstrates being a phenomenon almost extinct in this country, although the common violence is definitely very high. There are no connections between political and social violence. Reports and data from non-government organizations and human rights groups indicate that there can be PVEs victims in the country side of Brazil, in the rural areas which are not sufficiently monitored.

Finally, the rate of deaths caused by PVEs reaches 1,96 (refer to Board 1). Besides that, almost 6 people are arrested and almost 8 are detained in each political violence event registered in South America. This data indicates that PVEs not only are very frequent in the region but also they are not harmless in times of relative peace. These events generate human damages almost every time they occur, some cases more serious than others. In the best case scenario, these social volcanoes are dormant or with low activity. Definitely, they are not extinct on significant part of South American territory.

4 Is it possible to identify violence standards?

Already observed still as very recurrent pheno-

menon in South America, now it's important to better understand it. In this section of the essay, I make some possible descriptive interference based on collected information. First of all, regarding to monthly basis, we can notice that PVEs occur every year with relative stability, however a bit less in November (61) and December (59) due to Holidays Season (refer to Table 3). It has reached the peak in the middle of the year, particularly in May (103) and June (88) which are also aligned with variances between countries, separately, although this is not a rule. Months with more PVEs in Venezuela, for example, were February (24) and October (22). In Paraguay, the peaks were in April and September with five cases each.

Analyzing each month, a clear tendency cannot be noticed, showing a slight decrease between the second and the fourth week (refer to Table 4). PVEs occur regularly during the month, maintaining around 300 cases in the first and last 10 days, also known as intermediate period. In Argentina, they appear mostly in the beginning (12) and end (16) of the month. In Peru, the ten days in the middle of the month have 76 cases. It's important to mention that some cases were not specified due to the difficulty of gathering all information. It has not always been possible to find information on newspapers or complementary sources.

If it's not possible to identify the period of the month when most PVEs occur, it's at least clear that its incidence is significantly lower on weekends (refer to Table 5). Wednesday was the most explosive day, showing 162 occurrences. Beyond that, the events have been developed mostly in the morning, in the end of mornings and beginning of afternoons to be more precise. After this period, PVEs loose power showing less occurrences at night (refer to Table 6). Just a few can last over 6 hours non-stop. It can be noticed that this is a variable more difficult to obtain information on. Therefore, the number of cases per period decreases to only 536.

Men are the main victims of the PVEs (refer to Table 7). While 1.616 men had suffered some kind of damage with these events, only 232 women have been involved in these issues. This is another variable not much published by the news which may partly compromise the analysis, but it doesn't become impossible. In certain way, we expect to see more men involved in PVEs because they are generally associated to ordinary violence event. Universal studies show that women get less involved with violence. Specifically in Chile, the fact that the there are

more women (23) than men (14) involved in VPEs may be a reflect of how newspapers provide the news: as extraordinary.

Referring to the age range, young people are the main victims because they are also actors of the protests movements. No less than 394 people younger than 30 years old were directly affected by PVEs, against only 88 adults between 30 and 40 year old. The incidence of those who are over 40 years old, 140 cases registered with available information (refer to Table 8). Maybe this can be explained by the difficulty of having a job not only after but before their 40's. Besides that, the old generation has participated on other protests during the period of democratization in South America during the 80's. The memory of these tough conflicts could be contributing to a greater incidence of victims in this age range. But, for now, this is only speculation.

Most of the times, PVEs don't last longer than one day, after that they simply disappear (refer to Table 9). This is true not only for the total (726 cases) but for all countries individually examined. From the total of extended events, 59 did not last longer than 3 days, 28 took between 4 to 7 days and only 17 cases took between 8 and 10 days. Curiously, there is a relevant amount of cases (69) which last longer, over 10 days. Not influenced by the survival, however, South American PVEs catalogued during the analyzed period are in general Level 1, which is the lower severity level and could have a maximum of one death (695 cases). Some cases (145) have reached Level 2, between 2 and 10 deaths. Only 39 cases in Level 3 and none beyond that. Even with some lack of information, we are able to assure that, although frequent, PVEs in the region occur in low intensity, not being as severe as they have been in the past. Hence, they have not attracted much attention of the society neither of the social sciences.

We certainly can state that PVEs are more urban phenomenon than rural (refer to Table 11). They occur in cities, especially small and medium ones which have rapidly grown in the last years. Still, rural areas are far from being irrelevant. From the total of cases with available information, 543 had occurred in urban areas or have mostly been developed there, while 341 cases had occurred in the rural area or had most remarks there. This is consistent with South American urbanization process, already well-advanced since at least three decades. Cities are filled with young people, workers and retired people.

This is where things happen today. Despite the insistence for the agrarian reform movements and its capability to protest, rural areas have sensitively been evacuated. Several movements in the field are generated by indigenous or originary people.

Events investigated here occur a few times in the entire country (refer to Table 12). There have been only 49 PVEs cases registered spread through all territory. They can be noticed in higher amounts outside capital cities (700 cases). However, capital cities keep holding several violent conflicts, 172 cases were mapped. A qualitative data analysis could confirm that there has been national repercussion much greater and relevant to the political process.

Victims of the PVEs are related to different groups (refer to Table 13). Those that more suffer are the civilians, with 3.687 cases observed. Followed by Police and military with 1.709 cases. Then we can see participants of guerrillas with 589 cases and indigenous with 112 cases. In many cases the news didn't bring enough information or contained contradictory information not being able to complete data with accuracy. As is, it's clear that the two social groups in violent conflict in South America are sections from the State and the society. This reveal is in align with what the theory exposed in the introduction presumes. It's nothing to highlight here that exceptionally in Chile and Ecuador there are more police and military victims than civilian ones. In Ecuador, however, it can be explained by the larger number of indigenous victims (57). But in Chile, if the data is correct, it can be noticed the State in this country has been less violently repressive generating less civilian victims. But anyways, data from Santiago seems aligned with the democratic evolution.

The types of PVEs may vary. It has been possible to categorize some of them (refer to Table 14). Social uprisings have reached the total of 257 cases, highlighting those in Bolivia due to political difficulties faced by the president Evo Morales. The attacks reached 178 cases. Events involving weapon and drugs trafficking summed 48 cases. And, finally, 34 deaths isolated. General conflicts summed 407 cases. It's interesting to observe that PVEs from weapon and drug trafficking have occurred repetitively in Peru and Bolivia. This data confirms the information available about the increase of weapon and drugs flow especially in these two countries. The attacks have been much greater in Colombia (93 cases), exactly due to these terrorist groups combining trafficking de-

alers and warriors. If, on one hand, this could be easily explained in Colombia, on the other hand the increasing number of attacks in this country may surprise us.

The majority of PVEs have political motivation (543 cases). The second main cause is social (196 cases) and the third is economical (104 cases). Few registers show culture as a cause (19 cases). In fact, more than one of these causes played roles with same weights when generating these episodes of political violence. The large rates of violence caused by social aspects in Venezuela (72 cases) and the high number caused by political reasons in Colombia and Peru should be highlighted here. These two last mentioned countries have had some of the most serious internal war issues in Latin America, with Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (Farc) and the Sendero Luminoso, respectively. The significant number of cases explained by cultural demands in Chile has originated from movements claiming for educational reforms and mapuches indigenous groups (refer to Table 16).

Finally, it's important to notice that the most common stabilization measure in political events in South America in that period kept being the military repression, with 340 cases (refer to Table 16). The police investigation was adopted with 152 cases observed. The dispersion was adopted in at least 35 cases. And in only 29 registers there have been conciliation and agreement with the government right after conflicts. Many times there was not found any immediate solution for these violent conflicts. In not less than 239 cases people simply waited the violence to come to an end by itself. From the information survey, the repression has been greater in Venezuela (94 cases) and in Colombia (93 cases), countries where the government has opposite ideology, left-wing and right-wing. In Bolivia, it could be seen more reconciliation measures (18 cases).

Behind all these data rise some standards which may reasonably and clearly describe the PVEs. They happen every year, dozens in each month and mostly in the middle of the year, on Wednesdays between the end of mornings and beginning of afternoons. As the military repression is still the most usual stabilization measure, there are many murdered, wounded and arrested people mostly men, young people and civilians. In general PVEs are more likely a day with disasters, with relatively low intensity. They occur more frequently in the urban centers and other regions outside the capital, although in these areas they can have more impact. The social revolt

is the most common type, generally with political causes or motivation. Remarkably differences between countries need to be also taken into consideration. Colombia is the most politically violent country and Uruguay is the less violent in the region. Although, the political violence is not especially homogeneous. There are spots of conflicts in some areas and a quiet environment in other ones. Future studies should deeply analyze these differences between democracies in the continent, gathering more data and increasing the number of variables not here explored.

Considering only the social inequality, everyone knows this is one of the most regions where the difference between these levels is so different which certainly contributes to the maintenance of political violence. Apparently there is a correlation between these variables as predicted by the specialized literature. But this doesn't explain everything. Brazil, for instance, presents a social inequality greater than Andean countries but it has shown less PVEs registers than them, in absolute and relative terms. On the other hand, Peru is not between those with most inequality in South America but it is one of the most violent. Sophisticated tests are not needed in order to soon realize that there is no definitive correlation between inequality and violence. What would explain the violence standards verified previously?

It's not a matter of authority schemes, as the transition to democracy has ended for at least two decades and there have not been crisis in the repressive apparatus, conversely, they equate. A hypothetical tradition of violent conflicts would not explain the variance between these cases nor was it possible to notice a rapid change on the existing system of values. Instead of increasing, social cleavages have probably decreased during the economical bonanza period. Notwithstanding the advances in modernization, the period when changes occurred more rapidly had already happened before 2008 with the expansion of large cities and educational networks. If none of this explains the political violence events, still remains its relationship with inclusive institutions. *Inclusive institutions are those that instead of repel they attract political opponents and actors.*

The presence of these institutions capable of adjusting interests and values could be responsible for making registers of PVEs almost irrelevant in Uruguay, Chile and Brazil. In Uruguay there is the articulation of all political chains in national institutions in accommodated balance, and with a vast left-wing front moderated in the gover-

nment. In Brazil, as it is so wide, it's hard to imagine a way to make the political government coalition greater than what it has become with a left-wing Party moderate ruling, also with capacity of articulation between social movements. In Chile, after elections in 2010, a solid Party concentration has made the government a right-wing Party which could explain the increase of PVEs in 2011. The rising of the Piñera president not only has changed the political accommodation but also has made the government distant from the society, particularly from students and groups of rebelled indigenous.

On the other hand, a lower political inclusion maintained the occurrence of PVEs higher in Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina. In these countries, in general, after a slight pause post presidential elections there has been an increasing political polarization and rivalry between government and opposition which has established a standard of conflicting relationships based on mutual distrust, antagonism, lack of conversation and coordination of demands. This power struggle boosted the social movements in the streets and also the radicalism against fragile Party systems and rivals politics. Finally, Colombia maintained its historical based on societies sparked by the survival of drug warriors who have simply prevented any political approach. There have not yet been any political institution capable of attract opponents, yet seen as enemies. Left-wing radical groups and those right-wing didn't adopt democracy as an action method.

5 Conclusion

The political violence seen in the democratic South America doesn't resemble irregular violent conflicts held post-Cold War, described by international literature such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda or the Former Yugoslavia (CONTEH-MORGAN, 2004). Nor resembles the violence in military schemes and great Marxists guerrillas in the continent history. This, however as mentioned, doesn't mean they had disappeared.

It's not a matter of bankrupt States nor conflicts commonly found during decolonization, construction of the State or Cold War. These are minor intensity conflicts most times without the presence of armed groups organized with political purpose. These are spontaneous movements, although frequent and differentiated by analyzed cases.

Data found in researches enforces the hypotheses

the collective political violence is endemic to all heterogeneous society, taking several forms (CONTEH-MORGAN, 2004), or even a social element in part of contentious (TILLY, 2003). Most of these conflicts are only traditional conflicts recycled based on frustration of these individuals and groups with the social structure, which leads us back to the theoretical discussion already anticipated in the introduction.

Results generated from the PVEs were aligned with the Newerberian historical sociology view, where the capitalist system gives unequal rights on the productive process and feeds an endemic conflict between social levels by authority resources. Not only during its formation is the State seen as an instrument of internal pacification surveillance for societies, making the capitalism and its inequalities feasible. At last, violence is always present either in radical manifestation caused by dissatisfaction or in coercion promoted by the State in order to pacify those manifestations.

Differing from this sociological view, this essay has shown that political violence goes beyond differences between social classes, preservation of the economy, and it cannot be resolved by establishing a competitive democracy. There are strong political components in this phenomenon which goes beyond the scope of structuralism analysis. The political violence in the region survived the processes at least two decades of democracy and it's far from relying only on the uneasiness caused by neoliberal economical politics or by the market prevalence. This violence is a consequence of lack of political accommodation of groups (not only classes) in the heart of the State, brought by less inclusive institutions.

Even in peacetimes with economic progress, the South American conflicts used to generate violence. This is a consequence of the combination of economic inequality and political exclusion which left a scar in the region and years of global growth could not erase them. The benefits of the globalization were also unequally distributed. Latin America is the most unequal region in the world. Besides that, in many countries the State yet didn't become accessible to several social groups. In other words, the social inequality does not explain everything. Brazil is one of the most heterogeneous countries in Latin America but didn't present very bad results in terms of political violence. The inclusion of groups in the political system and State resources – already analyzed in previous articles (COUTINHO, 2008) – seem to be the decisive variable in

order to decrease this kind of violence.

The idea that political violence is an immediate effect of the presence of ideologies which justify them (DELLA PORTA, 1995) is not being supported in this research. Even if those ideologies could be important in the post-Cold War period, its radical versions needed to find any political opportunity in order to manifest within the escalation of conflicts. The radicalization process relies on tactical adaptations between social groups. In general, despite some cases, violence was more spontaneous and unpredictable than actually planned. Unlikely what we could think, democracy didn't work as permissive element responsible for the violence. The South America study allow us to initially say that the more inclusive democratic institutions present in a country, the less the dissemination of political violence can be observed.

South America is a region where battle between States has come to an end. The last armed conflict between countries was in 1995, a war between Peru and Ecuador. With no severe ethnic conflicts and no religious persecution or sectarian violence, our regional organisms are based on the essential compromise with the democracy. But this doesn't mean that the political violence is over. South America is a region where internal violence overcomes international violence. PVEs in times of peace are part of the system as small short circuits, some longer than others. There must be further studies about these events because we could still face in the future new cycles of protests and escalation of violence. In this essay, a descriptive data analysis has been done leaving accurate association between variable, such as advance statistics usage and cases study to analyze qualitative aspects, for further studies.

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Tables

Table 1 – Amount of PVEs in South America per Year (2008-2011).

Countries	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Argentina	11	11	12	8	42
Brazil	11	6	7	11	35
Bolivia	30	13	23	28	94
Colombia	56	43	50	89	238
Chile	3	0	11	19	33
Ecuador	15	8	16	7	46
Paraguay	9	2	11	5	27
Peru	52	51	55	59	217
Uruguay	1	1	0	0	2
Venezuela	53	32	52	45	182
Total	241	167	237	271	916

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL).

Table 2 – Amount of PVEs Victims in South America (2008-2011).

Countries	Murdered	Wounded	Missing	Arrested	Total
Argentina	11	237	0	418	666
Brazil	54	177	6	771	1008
Bolivia	34	741	93	537	1405
Colombia	1053	1046	80	377	2556
Chile	4	398	0	3925	4327
Ecuador	39	489	9	256	793
Paraguay	24	159	0	70	253
Peru	280	1367	202	68	1917
Uruguay	0	0	0	15	15
Venezuela	51	645	27	538	1261
Total	1550	5259	417	6975	14201

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL).

Board I – Political Violence Events (PVEs): South America (2008 – 2011)

Total number of PVEs:	916
Number of death per PVEs:	1550/916 = 1,69
Number of wounded per PVEs:	5259/916 = 5,74
Number of arrested per PVEs:	6975/916 = 7,61

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL).

Table 3 – Amount of PVEs in South America per Month (2008 -2011).

Countries	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Argentina	3	3	5	1	6	5	5	2	1	2	4	4	41
Brazil	5	0	3	2	4	1	5	2	4	5	2	2	35
Bolivia	4	6	8	7	11	14	12	8	8	5	3	8	94
Colombia	16	17	21	14	37	22	28	19	22	15	15	12	238
Chile	1	4	4	4	5	3	2	4	3	1	1	1	33
Ecuador	1	3	2	5	6	6	5	3	8	5	1	1	46
Paraguay	1	3	3	5	1	3	1	3	5	0	1	1	27
Peru*	19	16	20	20	21	24	14	18	15	17	17	15	216
Uruguay	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Venezuela	18	24	15	14	12	10	15	12	10	22	16	14	182
Total	68	77	81	72	103	88	87	71	76	72	61	58	914

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL) | * One case which EVP starting month was not identified.

Table 4 – Amount of PVEs in South America per Month (2008 -2011).

Countries	First ten days of the month	Intermediate Period	Last ten days of the month	Total
Argentina	12	2	16	30
Brazil	9	14	12	35
Bolivia	34	22	38	94
Colombia	83	79	76	238
Chile	10	14	9	33
Ecuador	17	15	14	46
Paraguay	11	7	9	27
Peru*	74	76	62	212
Uruguay	1	1	0	2
Venezuela	57	58	67	182
Total	308	288	303	899

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL).

* Peru: 5 cases not specified.

Table 5 – Amount of PVEs in South America per Week Day (2008-2011).

Countries	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun	Total
Argentina	3	3	5	1	6	5	5	2
Brazil	5	0	3	2	4	1	5	2
Bolivia	4	6	8	7	11	14	12	8
Colombia	16	17	21	14	37	22	28	19
Chile	1	4	4	4	5	3	2	4
Ecuador	1	3	2	5	6	6	5	3
Paraguay	1	3	3	5	1	3	1	3
Peru*	19	16	20	20	21	24	14	18
Uruguay	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela	18	24	15	14	12	10	15	12
Total	68	77	81	72	103	88	87	71

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)

* Peru: 46 cases not specified. / ** Colombia: 16 cases not specified.

Table 6 – Amount of PVEs in South America per Period of the Day (2008 -2011).*

Countries	Morning	Afternoon	Night	Entire Day	Total
Argentina	22	4	4	0	30
Brazil	3	14	8	0	25
Bolivia	26	9	8	5	48
Colombia	35	34	50	0	119
Chile	2	4	3	12	21
Ecuador	20	7	3	0	30
Paraguay	7	10	10	0	27
Peru	31	38	33	3	105
Uruguay	1	0	1	0	2
Venezuela	84	50	22	0	156
Total	231	170	142	20	563

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL).

*In many cases, it was not possible to identify the exact time.

Table 7 – Amount of Victims per Gender (2008-2011).*

Countries	Women	Men	Total
Argentina	0	0	0
Brazil	0	0	0
Bolivia	27	192	219
Colombia	55	497	552
Chile	23	14	37
Ecuador	20	123	143
Paraguay	27	107	134
Peru	33	562	595
Uruguay	6	9	15
Venezuela	41	112	153
Total	232	1616	1848

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)

* In many cases, it was not possible to identify the gender.

Table 8 – Amount of Victims per Age Range (2008 - 2011).*

Countries	Up to 20 years old	From 21 to 30	From 31 to 40	Over 40 years old	Total
Argentina	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	0	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	14	17	4	13	48
Colombia	101	76	19	27	223
Chile	7	4	2	0	13
Ecuador	12	7	1	2	22
Paraguay	5	16	11	40	72
Peru	43	51	41	37	172
Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela	11	30	10	21	72
Total	193	201	88	140	622

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)
* In many cases, it was not possible to identify the age.

Table 9 – Amount of Victims per PVEs Duration (2008-2011).

Countries	1 day	2 to 3 days	4 to 7 days	8 to 10 days	Over 10 day	Total
Argentina	33	4	1	0	3	41
Brazil	30	0	3	1	1	35
Bolivia	62	9	3	8	12	94
Colombia	186	12	11	4	25	238
Chile	24	7	0	0	2	33
Ecuador	31	2	3	2	8	46
Paraguay	25	1	0	0	1	27
Peru*	179	14	2	0	6	201
Uruguay	2	0	0	0	0	2
Venezuela	154	10	5	2	11	182
Total	726	59	28	17	69	899

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)
* Peru: 16 cases not specified.

Table 10 – Amount of PVEs per Severity (2008-2011).

Countries	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Total
Argentina	2	3	0	0	0	5
Brazil	33	1	1	0	0	35
Bolivia	89	4	1	0	0	94
Colombia	124	82	32	0	0	238
Chile	32	1	0	0	0	33
Ecuador	40	4	2	0	0	46
Paraguay	21	6	0	0	0	27
Peru	175	39	3	0	0	217
Uruguay	2	0	0	0	0	2
Venezuela	177	5	0	0	0	182
Total	695	145	39	0	0	879

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)
Level 1: up to 1 person murdered, Level 2: from 2 to 10 people murdered, Level 3: from 10 to 50, Level 4: from 50 to 100, Level 5: over 100 people murdered.

Table 11 – Amount of PVEs per Location (2008-2011).

Countries	Urban Area	Rural Area	Total
Argentina	39	2	41
Brazil	29	6	35
Bolivia	74	20	94
Colombia**	80	134	214
Chile	23	10	33
Ecuador	29	17	46
Paraguay	9	18	27
Peru*	84	126	210
Uruguay	2	0	2
Venezuela	174	8	182
Total	543	341	884

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)
* Peru: 7 cases not specified. ** Colombia: 24 cases not specified.

Table 12 – Amount of PVEs Per Territorial Extention (2008-2011).

Countries	Entire Country	Capital Only	Other Regions	Total
Argentina	1	18	22	41
Brazil	0	18	17	35
Bolivia	7	21	66	94
Colombia	14	8	216	238
Chile	12	11	10	33
Ecuador	5	4	37	46
Paraguay	0	8	19	27
Peru*	5	26	182	213
Uruguay	0	2	0	2
Venezuela	5	46	131	182
Total	49	162	700	911

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)
* Peru: 4 cases not specified.

Table 13 – Amount of PVEs per Victim Types (2008-2011).

Countries	Civilians	Police e military	Indigenous	Members of Guerrillas	Others	TOTAL
Argentina	587	76	0	0	3	666
Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	407	169	0	0	14	590
Colombia	980	627	21	247	321	2196
Chile	62	76	5	0	1	144
Ecuador	92	143	57	21	7	320
Paraguay	130	21	24	4	0	179
Peru	755	552	0	317	23	1647
Uruguay	1	0	0	0	1	2
Venezuela	673	45	5	0	0	723
Total	3687	1709	112	589	370	6467

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)
* In many cases, it was not possible to identify the type of victim.

Table 14 – Amount of PVEs per Type of Events (2008-2011).

Countries	Social Revolts	Attacks	Weapon and Drugs Trafficking	Murders	Conflicts in general	TOTAL
Argentina	30	0	0	0	11	41
Brazil	32	0	2	1	0	35
Bolivia	48	16	10	0	20	94
Colombia	27	93	6	13	106	245
Chile	6	1	0	1	25	33
Ecuador	33	2	0	0	11	46
Paraguay	8	0	0	6	13	27
Peru	38	28	26	13	114	219
Uruguay	1	1	0	0	0	2
Venezuela	34	37	4	0	107	182
Total	257	178	48	34	407	924

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)
*Some EVPs have more than one classification.

Table 15 – Amount of PVEs per Cause (2008-2011).

Countries	Political	Economical	Social	Cultural	Outthers	TOTAL
Argentina	11	6	19	0	5	41
Brazil	18	1	6	0	10	35
Bolivia	39	13	22	2	18	94
Colombia	197	5	19	2	15	238
Chile	8	2	16	7	0	33
Ecuador	27	2	14	0	3	46
Paraguay	18	0	8	0	1	27
Peru	137	73	19	6	8	243
Uruguay	1	0	1	0	0	2
Venezuela	87	2	72	2	19	182
Total	543	104	196	19	79	941

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL)
*There are EVPs with more than one causes.

Table 16 – Amount of PVEs per Type of Stabilization Measures (2008-2011).

Countries	Military Repression	Police Investigation	Dispersion	Agreement with the government	No Measures	Others	TOTAL
Argentina	29	0	0	0	12	0	41
Brazil	22	2	0	4	0	7	35
Bolivia	21	21	10	18	8	16	94
Colombia	93	42	7	1	63	32	238
Chile	19	4	1	1	8	0	33
Ecuador	38	1	0	1	0	6	46
Paraguay	9	5	0	0	3	10	27
Peru	14	40	13	0	101	49	217
Uruguay	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
Venezuela	94	37	4	3	44	0	182
Total	340	152	35	29	239	120	915

Source: Laboratório de Estudos da América Latina (LEAL).