

Brazil: the Carambole Strategy of a Rising Power*

Brasil: a Estratégia 'Carambola' de um Poder Ascendente

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the multilateral Brazilian foreign policy, making the country a regional pivot in Latin America, a leading nation among developing countries, and an emerging world power. Without the status of nuclear power, Brazil establishes asymmetrical alliances to earn a place in a reformed UN Security Council, but must contend the seat with accredited competitors, such as India, as well a strategic partner, and counteract some riotous neighbors, as Mexico and Argentina. Meanwhile, through the establishment and the membership in several international organizations and multilateral mechanisms, Brasília develops a worldwide policy, maneuvering between new and old alliances, and playing a 'winning and losing carambole game'. Will the chrysalis turn into a butterfly?

Keywords: Brazil. UNASUR. BRICS. IBSA. BASIC. MERCOSUR.

Resumo

Este trabalho analisa a política externa multilateral do Brasil, fazendo o país um pivô regional na América Latina, uma nação que assume a liderança entre os países em desenvolvimento e uma potência mundial emergente. Sem o status de potência nuclear, o Brasil estabelece alianças estratégicas para ganhar um lugar num Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas reformado, mas tem que competir por este lugar com concorrentes de peso, tal como a Índia, assim como um parceiro estratégico, e para contrapor-se a alguns vizinhos complexos, tal como o México e a Argentina. Enquanto isso, através do estabelecimento e da afiliação a muitas organizações internacionais e mecanismos multilaterais, Brasília desenvolve uma política mundial, manobrando entre alianças novas e antigas, e jogando "carambola" com a possibilidade de conseguir o perder. A crisálida vai virar borboleta?

Palavras-chave: Brasil. UNASUR. BRICS. IBSA. BASIC. MERCOSUR.

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1 Introduction

With 200 million people, Brazil is the fifth most populous country in the world. The Brazilian economy is the largest in Latin America and the seventh largest in the world in terms of nominal GDP for purchasing power (International Monetary Fund, 2011). With a gross domestic product of 2.253 USD billion in 2012, Brazil occupies the 7th place in the world rankings (International Monetary Fund, 2013). Brazil is one of the fastest growing economies in the world economy and economic reforms have given a new international recognition to the country, both regionally and globally.

Following the economic growth, the South American country seeks to expand its geopolitical influence. Brazil has woven a spider web which, starting from South America, covering all of Latin America and the Western Hemisphere, to the Eastern Hemisphere, with interests also in the Southern Hemisphere.

Brazilian foreign policy has generally been based on the principles of multilateralism. Brazil is a founding member of the United Nations (UN), the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), the Latin Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of Ibero-American States (OEI), the Southern Cone Common Market (Spanish: Mercosul; Portuguese: Mercosur), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), BRICS, BASIC, and the IBSA Trilateral Dialogue Forum; moreover is one of the member countries of the G-20 and of the G-4.

Conscious of its emerging economic power, Brazil wants to carve out a leading role also in world politics. Policy initiatives taken by the government of Brasília in the last twenty years, aim to make the South American giant the leader for political and economic integration, and for social development of the continent, as well as to set up a regional defense and security mechanism, promoting military co-operation, with the ambition to support major emerging economies such as China and India. However, being an emerging country does not mean being an emerging power: Brazil can actually be considered a rising 'middle power'.

The strategy of Brazil, to establish itself as the dominant regional power, includes integration initiatives and monetary policy, the social and economic development, action to make funding available for development, in particular aimed at social inclusion and building a

network of infrastructure that links between them, more efficiently, the South American countries, even in terms of increasing trade in goods and the mobility of citizens without visa requirements. There's also a project of common defense and security policy among the South American countries, although it encounters more difficulties.

2 The First Step of a Rising Power: the Backyard Strategy

The strategy of Brazil has been paid, at first, to consolidate its position in the South American continent. In 1991, Brazil was one of the founders of Mercosur², the common market of South America, established on the basis of the experience of the European Union's internal market or 'Common Market'. The goal of Mercosur is to achieve a common market with the abolition of customs duties.

Mercosur has gone, gradually expanded, and today, in addition to the founding countries (as well as Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay - currently suspended - Uruguay and Venezuela), sees the association of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the interest of Mexico and New Zealand as observers.

The focus of Brazil to other South American countries, with which it wants to implement a program of political collaboration, cultural and economic life, is also underlined by the Union of South American Nations (*Unión de Naciones Suramericanas*, UNASUR), the cooperation program established in May 2008, at the Third Summit of Heads of State, held in Brasília (UNASUR, 2014). UNASUR is an intergovernmental union integrating two existing customs unions - Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations - as part of a continuing process of South American integration, which entered into force on March 2011, after Uruguay became the ninth state to ratify the Treaty, thus giving the union full legality. As a founder member of UNASUR, Brazil was an associate member of Mercosur and of the Andean Community.

Formerly designated as the South American Community of Nations, the mechanics of the new entity, established by seven founding countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela and Uruguay), came

² MERCOSUR. *Selected Rules. Foundational Instruments of Mercosur* [pdf]. Mercosur: Montevideo. Available at: <http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/2486/1/0_libro_mercosur_-_port.pdf>. Accessed: 23 feb. 2015.

out of the First South American Community of Nations Heads of State Summit, which was held in Brasília in September 2005. The aim of the Strategic Plain 2012-2022³ is to eliminate tariffs for non-sensitive products by 2014 and sensitive products by 2019. Brazil is heavily involved in the implementation of the South American Integration Plan set by the COSIPLAN Agenda of Priority Projects⁴.

At present UNASUR include twelve member states (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Perú, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela), including two from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), as Guyana and Suriname, and two observers (Mexico and Panama).

UNASUR came up after the negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) multilateral agreement - an extension of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico, and the United States - reached a dead point in 2005⁵: developed nations ask to increase trade in services and to extend patents and intellectual property rights, while less developed countries call for an end to agricultural subsidise and free trade in agricultural goods, to open new markets to their products or to increase their export (FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, 2006)⁶.

As Samuel P. Huntington wrote in his 1993 article in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, which later expanded in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996): “The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western pre-dominance,

protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values” (HUNTINGTON, 1993, 1996).

FTAA, which aim is facilitating business measures and commercial exchange in the Western Hemisphere, opened its negotiations ensuring that will be “fully consistent with the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization” (MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRADE REPRESENTING THE 34 NATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS, 1995), and always reaffirmed that “will be consistent with the rules and disciplines of the World Trade Organization” (MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRADE IN THE HEMISPHERE, 2003)⁷ and that “will be compatible with and will build on the WTO” (MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRADE IN THE HEMISPHERE, 2002).

Brazil is at the forefront in the struggle of developing countries to obtain medicines at lower price; the action of the Brazilian government is not limited within the WTO, but it provides a global alliance with such nations: in November 2007, the Brazilian Minister of Health and the Ministries of other four member countries of Mercosur (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela) signed an agreement for the implementation of the Bank of Drug Prices (*Banco de Preços de Medicamentos*). The bank will contain the amounts paid by each of them in the purchase of medicine, following the Brazilian model (MINISTRY OF HEALTH, 2005), where health managers have available such information nationwide. To facilitate negotiations for lower prices at the laboratories, the system will contribute to increasing access to medicines and supplies in the region (SAMRSLA, 2009). The guidelines are included in the *Rio Document* (HEALTH MINISTERS OF MERCOSUR (HEALTH MINISTERS OF MERCOSUR, 2007)), which provides guidance on patent regimes and access to drugs for Mercosur. In January 2010 at the headquarters of Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)/World Health Organization (WHO), member of the UN system, in Brazil held the first meeting that began work to program the *Banco de Preços de Medicamentos* (BPM) for American countries (PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2010).

Similar to the WTO talks Brazil has taken a leadership role among the less developed nations, while the

³ SOUTH AMERICAN COUNCIL OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND PLANNING (COSIPLAN). *Strategic Action Plan for Ten Years (2012-2022)* [pdf]. Brasília, DF: Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management. Available at: <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/Arquivos/noticias/spi/111130_Cosiplan_PAE_Plano_de_%20acao_estrategico.pdf>. Accessed: 25 feb. 2015.

⁴ MINISTRY OF PLANNING, BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT. *Program 2043 South American Integration* [pdf]. Brasília, DF: Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management. Available at: <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/Arquivos/lai/120418_lai_prog_tematicos_2043.pdf>. Accessed: 25 feb. 2015.

⁵ The last summit was held at Mar del Plata, Argentina, in November 2005, but no agreement on FTAA was reached, and no meeting has took place later to resume negotiations.

⁶ See also *FTAA Trade Ministerial Meetings, Ministerial Declarations* [online]. Available at: <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Minis_e.asp>. Accessed: 25 feb. 2015.

⁷ See also MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRADE IN THE HEMISPHERE (2006).

United States has taken a similar role for the developed nations. Brazil proposed a series of bilateral agreements (FTAA has 34 standing members) to reduce specific tariffs on goods, and Washington established a series of bilateral trade deals.

To expand trade in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. moved in the direction of establishing a series of bilateral trade agreements with countries which are members of Mercosur (trade deal with Mercosur founding members, including Brazil, has already been signed in 1991), or of the Andean Community (1969). While is proposing itself as a leading country in the region, Brazil must take into account existing agreements between the United States and South American countries members of UNASUR, as well as its relationship with Washington: a policy that requires skills of diplomatic balancing act.

At the UNASUR Third South American Summit on 8 December 2004, presidents or representatives from 12 South American nations signed the *Cusco Declaration*⁸, a two-page statement of intent announcing the foundation of the South American Community (*Comunidad Suramericana de Naciones*, later renamed *Unión de Naciones Suramericanas*). The group announced their intention to model the new community after the European Union including a common currency, parliament, and passport, approving the concept of South American citizenship, and abolishing visa requirements for tourists between member nations. Presidents of the seven founding countries officially launched the South American Bank in Buenos Aires in December 2007, to “develop e new financial regional architecture”⁹.

On 9 December 2007 Brazil was one of the founding states, with Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay,

Uruguay e Venezuela, of the Bank of the South (Spanish: *Banco del Sur*, Portuguese: *Banco do Sul*), a development bank to fund infrastructure projects and support the public and private enterprises of the signatory countries (SCANDIUCCI, 2007, p. 19)¹⁰, and participates in its capital with 4,000 million dollars. One of the first projects to be examined by the new institution is the construction of a 12,500 km pipeline linking Venezuela to Argentina via Brazil.

UNASUR started plans of integration through infrastructure cooperation with the construction of the Interoceanic Highway, a road that intends to more firmly link the Pacific Coast countries, especially Chile and Peru with Brazil and Argentina by extending highways through the continent, allowing better connections to ports from Bolivia and the inner parts of Argentina, Peru, and Brazil. The first corridor, between Peru and Brazil, began construction in September 2005, financed 60 percent by Brazil and 40 percent by Peru, and was completed in December 2010. This Initiative for Infrastructure Integration of South America (IIRSA) has received the support of the Inter-American Development Bank and of the Development Bank of Latin America.

The ultimate goal of the Bank of the South is to include every state within the region of South America. The bank serves as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, remaining through the unpopularity of these institutions in Latin America, and has been established because of disapproval of the enforcement of unrelated free market reforms on countries seeking emergency loans (KLEIN, 2008). It also represents an attempt to achieve regional independence and endogenous development. The program would lend money to any nation involved in the construction of approved programs, and without conditions traditionally attached to such loans, such as deregulation.

This regional initiative fielded by Brazil, aims to create an alternative to the IMF and Word Bank, but not the only one: whitin the BRICS formed similar financial

⁸ PRESIDENTS OF THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AMERICA. *Cusco Declaration on the South American Community of Nations* [online]. Third South American Presidential Summit, Cusco, 8 December 2004. Lima: Andean Community, 2010. Available at: <http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/dec_int/cusco_sudamerica.htm>. Accessed: 25 feb. 2015.

⁹ COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS (UNASUR). *Statement by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)* [pdf], Asunción, 17 March 2012, Paragraph 13. Bogotá, DC: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: <https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/news/field_attached_news/Declaración%20de%20Asunción.pdf>. Accessed: 1 mar. 2015.

¹⁰ See also VAZ, 2008, p. 31. and MINISTRY OF PLANNING, BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT. DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS. *Assessment Report of the Multi-Year Plan 2004-2007: Year 2008-Base Year 2007. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Book 14* [pdf]. Brasília, DF: Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management. Department of Planning and Strategic Investments, 2008, p. 10. Available at: <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/Arquivos/spi/plano_plurianual/avaliacao_PPA/relatorio_2008/08_PPA_Aval_cad14_MRE.pdf>. Accessed: 23 feb. 2015.

institution, the New Development Bank.

On the side of the defense Brazil and Venezuela proposed the South American Defense Council (CDS) to serve as a mechanism for regional security, promoting military co-operation and regional defense (UNASUR, 2015). From the beginning Brazil, Argentina and Chile, the countries that took the leadership of the project, made clear that they did not intend to form a NATO-like alliance, but a cooperative security arrangement, enhancing multilateral military cooperation, promoting confidence and security building measures and fostering defense industry exchange.

Brazil is playing a leading role in building a strong political union among the South American countries, also favored by the fact that it has no territorial dispute with neighboring countries.

3 The Second Step: the Global Strategy

Achieved the regional leadership, Brazil poits to an alliance with the emerging economies, in particular, with the Republic of South Africa and India, as part of the BRICS. BRICS is an acronym used in international economics referring collectively to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, whome are distinguished by their large, fast-growing economies and significant influence on regional and global affairs; all five are G-20 members. The BRICS represent a kind of club of 'potential superpowers'.

At the Copenhagen climate summit held on 28 November 2009, four of this nations - Brazil, South Africa, India and China, excluding Russia - established the BASIC countries, a bloc of newly industrialized countries, leding and representing the major developing counties, opposing, within the WTO, the developed nations led by the European Union, the United States, and Japan, even if Tokyo joined Brazil in the G-4. The contention on patents on medicines, inside FTAA and WTO, makes Brazil an ally of the African countries, in need of expensive treatment for HIV/AIDS, a pandemic that plagues the continent, with 23,5 million people leaving with HIV in 2011 (latest data available) (JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 2012). South Africa, a strong strategic ally of Brazil, has 5,600,000 cases.

As of 2014, the five BRICS countries represent almost 3 billion people, or approximately 40 percent of the world population. The five nations have a combined nominal GDP of 16.039 USD trillion, equivalent to ap-

proximately 20 percent of the gross world product, and an estimated 4 USD trillion in combined foreign reserves (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2011). By December 2014, the BRICS countries hold 1,669.1 USB billion of U.S. public debt¹¹, thus representing the main lenders to Washington.

In November 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has included the BRICS countries among the ten countries with the highest voting. Since the non-allocation of quotas, lying at the U.S. Congress, a redistribution which had been made by the countries of the BRICS, they have created their own independent financial structuring (New Development Bank) (MRE, 2014), an alternative to the IMF during their 6th summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, on 15 July 2014. The group of emerging countries agreed to create the 100 USD billion Development Bank (its initial stated capital is 50 USD billion), with primary focus of lending for infrastructure projects, and a reserve currency (Contingent Reserve Arrangement) worth over another 100 USD billion, to provide protection against global liquidity pressures (BRICS, 2014). Brazil contributes for 10 USD billion for the development capital, and would give 18 USD billion for the Currency Reserve Pool (PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE'S INFORMATION OFFICE, 2013). Both funds will counter the influence of Western-dominated IMF and World Bank lending institutions and the dollar. This is the second initiative fielded by the Brazilian government, to support developing countries, after the bank established within UNASUR. As wrote Huntington:

"Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund [...] reflect the interests of the West" and "the interests of the United States and other Western powers. Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate" (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 39).

The partnership among the BRICS countries, which has held annual summits since 2009, is becoming something more than just a commercial and cultural alliance; it's turning itself into a global political antagonist of the West-

¹¹ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRESAURY. *Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities* [online]. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Available at: <<http://www.treasury.gov/ticdata/Publish/mfh.txt>>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.

ern-dominate institutions. In March 2014, at a meeting on the margins of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, the BRICS Foreign Ministers expressed concern about the “recent media statement on the forthcoming G-20 Summit to be held in Brisbane in November” (NKOANA-MASH-ABANE, 2014), in response to the statement of Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, who had said earlier that Russian president Vladimir Putin might be barred from attending the G-20 Summit in Brisbane in light of the tensions surrounding the Crimean crisis.

On 15 April 2015 Brazil became one of the 57 founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) promoter by China (ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT, 2015). The AIIB is expected to be founded by the end of 2015 with a capital of 100 USD billion. It aims to support infrastructure projects in Asia, as well as the Bank of the South and the New Development Bank. As a regional development bank, AIIB's regional members, like Brazil, will be the majority shareholders; non-regional members will hold smaller equity shares. All strategic partners of Brasília, excluding Japan, have joined the initiative opposed by Washington as a potential competitor of Western-dominated IMF and World Bank. Apart from Portugal, Brazil is also the only member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries which joined the new Asian bank. Brazil is the only South American nation among the founding members of AIIB, thus confirming its vocation of ‘bridge builder’ between South America and Asia.

Brazil should try to bring in active its trade balance by exporting products and services to markets with stronger economies, such as China and India, if wants to be able to have resources to invest in its internal development.

4 Smart Power, Between Old Alliances and New Alliances

Despite the new global alliance between countries that oppose Western institutions, the U.S., as well as Europe, do not give up on relations with the South American giant, as “is clearly in the interest of the West [...] to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 49).

On the other hand, Brazil does not seem to want to give up the relationship with the Western countries, too,

“to attempt to ‘balance’ the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 41). The diplomatic choice of Brasília is mainly due to the negative situation of the balance of payments, which requires the South American country to keep open as many channels as possible for the export of goods and services.

Brazil registered a 3.93 USD billion trade deficit in 2014, the biggest since 1998 as exports declined more than imports, according to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC, 2015). Brazilian trade balance averaged 639.66 USD million from 1959 until 2015, reaching an all time high of 5659.37 USD million in July of 2006 and a record low of -4058.14 USD million in January of 2014.

From 2001 to 2012, Brazil ran regular trade surpluses, primarily due to high export of mining and agricultural products¹². In 2013, the country started recording trade deficits and in 2014 registered first annual trade deficit since 2000 as a decline in the value of commodities exports was higher than a drop in imports of consumption products. In 2014, the biggest trade deficits were recorded with the United States, and the biggest trade surpluses with China, which is the largest trading partner of Brazil and, in turn, Brazil is the ninth largest trading partner of China (MDIC, 2014).

The Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership has been established in 1993, and has been developed as well as international and regional issues of common interest, and in 2009 a Joint Action Plan (2010-2014) covering the whole spectrum of bilateral cooperation has been signed (JINTAO; LULA DA SILVA, 2009).

China has signed 32 cooperation agreements with Brazil, among them the one in the energy field, and the one for the production of 35 Embraer aircrafts (UNASUR, 2001), one of the largest aircraft manufacturers in the world, and one of the few Brazilian companies successful in international markets. The strong growth of the Chinese economy has forced the Asian country to depend on imports of agricultural supplies, mainly from

¹² MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN TRADE. *Other Foreign Trade Statistics* [online]. Brasília, DF: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. Available at: <<http://www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=608>>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.

Brazil, which exports soya, flour, corn, cotton and meat. The Brazilian-Chinese bilateral exchange has increased 20 times in the last decade, moving from a trade of 2,300 USD million dollars in 2000 to 56,400 USD million in 2010. China is Brazil's largest trading partner, largest export market and largest source of import.

The two countries maintain good relations and a coordination mechanism in international organizations and multilateral bodies, including the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the G-20, BRICS, and the BASIC countries.¹³

Although the Asian market represents for Brazil 45 billion trade surplus¹⁴, which concern raw materials together with some finished products, the South American giant does not give up the relationship with industrialized countries (the largest trading partner of Brazil, the European Union). In 2008, representatives of Mercosur and the European Union (EU) participated in meetings to assess the current state of negotiations between the two blocs, suspended in the previous two years. The effective recovery thereof shall be given after completion of the current round of WTO negotiations (Doha Round) and the consequent definition of the detailed rules for agricultural activities at the multilateral level (VAZ, 2008, p. 31). The developing countries, lead and represented by Brazil, as well as by China, India and South Africa, ask to break down trade barriers and agricultural subsidies (WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2015).

The position of Brazil with respect to the WTO, makes it a natural ally of all the developing countries of the global South, and of most of the nations of the Eastern Hemisphere. In this position, however, there are also other countries that aspire to the recognition of a geopolitical worldwide role, first of all India, and this does not bring any competitive benefit to Brazil.

Despite the controversy with the IMF and World

Bank and the alliance with Russia, China, India and South Africa, there is a good relationship with the United States, which does not have good relations with some Latin American countries (Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua in the head): Brazil plays an important role in mediating between the two blocks, although with caution as they do not want to stand out against other countries.

The United States engages with Brazil on trade and investment matters through a number of initiatives. On 19 March 2011, President Obama and President Rousseff signed the *Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation* (THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, 2011) "to enhance cooperation on trade and investment between the Western Hemisphere's two largest economies"¹⁵. The agreement expands the American "direct trade and investment relationship by providing a framework to deepen cooperation on a number of issues of mutual concern, including innovation, trade facilitation and technical barriers to trade", and "represents a shared commitment to broad-based economic growth, and is a foundation for cooperation in other trade fora"¹⁶. U.S. foreign direct investment in Brazil (stock) was 79.4 USD billion in 2012 (latest data available), up 7.5 percent from 2011¹⁷.

Washington is very concerned with the relations with the South American giant, which allows the U.S. trade balance to come to 107 USD billion of goods and private services trade with Brazil, totaling 29 USD billion surplus in 2012 (latest data available)¹⁸. Brazil was the United States' 7th largest goods export market in 2013 - U.S. exports to Brazil accounted for 2.8 percent of overall U.S. exports in 2013, excluding military sales, direct defense expenditures, and other miscellaneous government services - and is currently U.S. 9th largest goods trading

¹³ MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. *China and Brazil* [online]. Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, 2008-2014. Available at: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjfb_663304/zzjg_663340/ldmzs_664952/gjlb_664956/3473_665008/>. Accessed: 1 mar. 2015.

¹⁴ MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN TRADE. *Foreign Trade. Foreign Trade Statistics-DEAEX. Brazilian Trade Balance: Countries and Blocks. Countries and Economic Blocks* [online]. Brasília, DF: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. Available at: <<http://www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=4892&refr=576>>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.

¹⁵ THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR). *Home/Countries & Regions/Americas/Brazil* [online]. Washington, D.C.: The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Executive Office of the President of the United States. Available at: <<https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/brazil>>. Accessed: 24 feb. 2015.

¹⁶ THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), *Home/Countries & Regions/Americas/Brazil*.

¹⁷ THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), *Home/Countries & Regions/Americas/Brazil*.

¹⁸ THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), *Home/Countries & Regions/Americas/Brazil*.

partner with 72 USD billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2013 (the American surplus with Brazil was 17 USD billion in 2013). Trade in private services with Brazil (exports and imports) totaled 31 USD billion in 2012 (latest data available). The U.S. services trade surplus with Brazil was 17 USD billion in 2012. Brazil is also a major creditor and the sixth largest foreign holder of U.S. public debt, with 255.8 USD billion (latest data available at December 2014)¹⁹.

5 A Giant with Desire for Greatness

The position of Brazil reflects the multipolarity that distinguishes the world after the end of the Cold War. Many emerging countries have assumed the role of emerging powers, not only at the regional level, and Russia has risen from the ashes of the decadent era of Yeltsin.

As Huntington argued in 1993, world politics entered a new phase after the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 22), and “had been moved into a new aspect in which non-Western civilizations were no more the exploited recipients of Western civilization but become another important actor joining the West to shape and move the world history” (MURDEN, 2011, p. 416-426). It’s “The West versus the rest” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 39-41).

Even if the armed forces of Brazil are the second largest in Latin America by active personnel, with only approximately 190,000 soldiers on a population of 200,000,000, and the largest by the level of military equipment - at the 28th place in the world ranking of largest armies²⁰, and at 15th place of active duty uniformed troop strength²¹ - the lack of traditional hard power (military power and global security influence) is an obstacle to the ambitions of the country (HO CHUN, 2014). In confirmation of this ambition, there is the aircraft carrier São

Paulo²², which places the South American country among the 12 nations in the world to have this vessel (among the others: Japan, and India, with two units, and Russia and China, with one carrier each) (GLOBALFIREPOWER.COM, 2015). In addition to this, Brazil has plans to acquire two more aircraft carriers of 50,000 tons by 2028.²³

Brazil is the 12th state with the highest military expenditure in 2013 (33.5 USD billion on a total world military expenditure of 1747 USD billion, equivalent to 2.4 per cent of global GDP), after Italy and before Australia, making 1,8 per cent of the world budget (China is ranked in second position, after USA, with 11 per cent, Russia occupies third place with 5 per cent, Germany and Japan are both ranked equally at number seven and eight with 2,8 per cent, followed by India with 2,7 per cent (PERLO-FREEMAN; SOLMIRANO, 2014, p. 2). The experience of the military dictatorship (1964-1985) led to the will of the successive democratic governments, not to over-investment in the field of defense, so that Brazil is now having to recover this gap, becoming the largest spender in the region.

Brazil, as well as all other countries of the Western Hemisphere, is not a North Atlantic Alliance member. Non-Western countries are kept away from implementing their military capacity, as weapons, as well as the military option remains the last resort. Nuclear power is a political weapon, and Brazil, which claims a leading role not only regionally, but also globally, it is free, and this diminishes the political role. Brazil is balancing this lack of power in the BRICS initiative (FLEMES, 2010) even if India is an antagonist for the ride to the UN Security Council.

The availability of nuclear weapons increases the power and the political prestige of the country that holds, although these slating only value as a deterrent. Thus, “In the post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western

¹⁹ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, *Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities*.

²⁰ GLOBALSECURITY.ORG. *World's Largest Armies* [online]. Alexandria, VA: GlobalSecurity.org. Available at: <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armies.htm>>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.

²¹ GLOBALSECURITY.ORG. *Active Duty Uniformed Troop Strength* [online]. Alexandria, VA: GlobalSecurity.org. Available at: <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/active-force.htm>>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.

²² BRAZILIAN NAVY. *Features of the Aircraft Carrier Sao Paulo* [online]. Brasília, DF: Brazilian Navy. Available at: <https://www.marinha.mil.br/sites/default/files/imagens/poder_navai/unidades_navais/meios_esquadra/cards/1A12_saopaulo.html>. Accessed: 5 mar. 2015.

²³ BRAZILIAN NAVY. *Aircraft Carrier Obtaining Program (PRONAE)* [online]. Brasília, DF: Brazilian Navy. Available at: <http://www.mar.mil.br/acessoainformacao/html/acoes_programas/pronae.html>. Accessed: 5 mar. 2015.

interests” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 46). Development of a nuclear arsenal, as well as increase of conventional military strength weapons, it's a must for all nations which aspire to the role of a real power.

The Brazilian Navy (*Marinha do Brasil*) develops since 1979 a national interest nuclear program (Nuclear Parallel Program), in order to cause a reactor prototype for the nuclear-powered submarine (SN-BR) (BRAZILIAN NAVY, 2008). The goal of the program is to ensure the country's full field of the nuclear fuel cycle through the use of domestic technologies. Brazil has since 1958 the first nuclear reactor in South America, since 1988 Brazilian manufactured, and belongs to the select group of countries that have uranium enrichment technology, a strategic energy resource.

While the cycle of nuclear fuel production is complete, and Brazil has the ability to plan and manufacture its nuclear fuel without any external dependency, and has also the knowledge to project and build nuclear power plants²⁴, the program of the first Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine (COGESN) is ongoing in the Nuclear-Power Generation Laboratory (Labgene). The construction of the SN-BR started in 2012, and should be ready in 2023, when will undergo dock and sea tests and trials, and then transferred to the operating sector of the Navy in 2025²⁵. In this project are provided 13,600 direct jobs and 46,000 indirect, thus contributing to the economic and social development of the country.

These activities represent an important increase of power deterrent to the naval defense of the country, in addition to enlisting Brazil in the select group of holders of this strategic technology, whose knowledge is not shared (BILESKEY, 2014).

According to the Brazilian Navy²⁶ the construction of the SN-BR involves three important issues for the country: the strategic, the technological and the domestic industry. In naval warfare, submarines add an undeniable

strategic importance, which causes a deterrent effect, and the submarine with nuclear propulsion can be considered the 'Lord of the Seas', a fact that - according to the *Marinha do Brasil* (MB) - proves important considering that over 90 percent of Brazilian oil is extracted from the sea. Similarly, over 95 percent of Brazilian foreign trade is transported by sea. In the strategic conception of the MB, the availability of submarines of this type means adding a new dimension to naval power of the country, ensuring enviable deterrent capability.

Brazil, which at present does not enjoy the nuclear deterrence, either directly or as a member of NATO, however, is an ally of BRICS nuclear powers: India (since 1974), Russia (since 1949), and China (since 1964) (STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 2014), which hold the leadership in the Eastern Hemisphere, where Washington has lost influence, with India that wants to regain its lost importance in the region. South Africa ended its nuclear weapons programme in 1989, dismantled six bombs, and signed the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* on 10 July 1991 (PURKITT; BURGESS, 2005). None of this nations is a member of the International Energy Agency (IEA)²⁷.

China and Russia, in particular, which are regional powers in Asia, are threatened by the advance of NATO to the East, which now came to the Ukraine. Moreover, China claims Taiwan, officially still the Republic of China, as its 23rd province, to be under its sovereignty. The government of Taipei enjoys the protection of the U.S., granted under the *Taiwan Relations Act*²⁸. Despite this, U.S. president Barack Obama has stated that U.S.-China relationship to be “bilateral, regional and global cooperation to a new level” (XI; OBAMA, 2014). The United States has with China the most important bilateral trade relationship, with a trade volume increased from 5 USD

²⁴ BRAZILIAN NAVY. *The Navy Nuclear Program* [online]. Brasília, DF: Brazilian Navy. Available at: <<https://www.marinha.mil.br/programa-nuclear-da-marinha>>. Accessed: 15 mar. 2015.

²⁵ BRAZILIAN NAVY. *Submarine Development Program (PROSUB)* [pdf]. Brasília, DF: Brazilian Navy. Available at: <<https://www.mar.mil.br/acessoainformacao/pdf/snbr.pdf>>. Accessed: 15 mar. 2015.

²⁶ BRAZILIAN NAVY. *Submarine Development Program (PROSUB)*, p. 2-3.

²⁷ ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)/INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA). *Non-member countries* [online]. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/International Energy Agency (IEA). Available at: <<http://www.iea.org/countries/non-member-countries/>>. Accessed: 1 mar. 2015.

²⁸ U.S.A. CONGRESS. *Taiwan Relations Act* [pdf], TRA; Pub.L. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, Enacted 10 April 1979; H.R. 2479. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO). Available at: <<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-93/pdf/STATUTE-93-Pg14.pdf>>. Accessed: 27 feb. 2015.

billion in 1981 to 535 USD billion in 2012²⁹. China is also the major creditor and the largest foreign holder of U.S. public debt, with 1,244.3 USD billion (latest data available at December 2014)³⁰.

As non-Western nations, these countries “assert their right to acquire and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 46). “Centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of China’s military power and its means to create military powder”, which is “is rapidly increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed forces” and “is also a major exporter of arms and weapons technology” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 47), as well as Russia (in Latin American countries is growing rapidly park Russian-made helicopters). Brasília can enjoy indirectly the prestige conferred by atomic weapons, thanks to the axis with BRICS nuclear powers.

The total military expenditure of BRICS nations amounts to 359,259 USD million, compared to the U.S. defense budget, which amounts to 640,221 USD million (Brazil 31,456, Russia 87,837, India 47,398, China 188,460, South Africa 4,108) (STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 2014). While the United States has the world’s largest army (1,369,000 soldiers), the BRICS totalize 1,975,000 strength³¹, reaching top position if we consider Chinese active duty uniformed troop strength, with a total of 4,921,000 soldiers compared to U.S. 1,625,852 personnel³². During the 2000s, military spending increased fairly rapidly in most of the BRICS countries (Brazil, India, Russia and China), but since 2009–10 these increases have stopped or gone slightly into reverse, as economic growth has weakened and spending on other sectors has taken priority (PERLO-FREEMAN; SOLMIRANO, 2014, p. 3).

Without nuclear weapons, Brazil tries to establish itself as an emerging space power, working with other na-

tions, including China, India and Russia, which have different space programs (HARVEY; SMID; PIRAD, 2010). The Brazilian Space Agency (*Agência Espacial Brasileira*, AEB) has the most advanced space program in South America, and on 30 March 2006 put into space an astronaut, according with Russian Space Agency: a 20 USD million ticket paid by Brasília to enter from the back door in the exclusive club of space powers. As part of the development of aerospace capabilities, the Brazilian Air Force (*Força Aérea Brasileira*) has built in the General Command of Aerospace Technology, current Department of Aerospace Science and Technology (DCTA), the greatest pulsed hypersonic wind tunnel in Latin America, known as ‘T3’ (PASSARO; DERMEVAL; MIGLIANO, 2009).

The Chinese are far away from Russians, and they are planning to put in space a space station in 2020 and programming expeditions to the Moon and Mars.

Beijing has signed governmental space cooperation agreements with Brazil (CHINA NATIONAL SPACE ADMINISTRATION, 2009), India and Russia, among the other countries, and “Significant achievements have been scored in the bilateral and multilateral and technology exchanges and cooperation”³³, as reported by the China National Space Administration (CNSA).

Despite agreements with countries that oppose U.S. policies in many fields, Brazil does not renounce cooperation with Washington, including the training of its astronauts at NASA (NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, 1997). Moreover, between the Brazilian Institute of Advanced Studies of Aerospace Technology General Command (IEAv-CTA) and the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory is an ongoing joint research project (International Beamed Propulsion Research Collaboration) to develop a propulsion system for laser space rockets and aircraft, which will make the first launches between 2020 and 2015 (BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE, 2011). Project objective is to develop technology of hypersonic aspirate propulsion vehicle, build by the international Brazilian-American-Australian consortium Screamspace, with laser propulsion capable of satelizar nanosatellites (MINUCCI, 2010). The idea of using laser

²⁹ U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. *Trade in Goods with China* [pdf]. Suitland, Md.: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at: <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.

³⁰ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, *Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities*.

³¹ GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, *World’s Largest Armies*.

³² GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, *Active Duty Uniformed Troop Strength*.

³³ CHINA NATIONAL SPACE ADMINISTRATION (CNSA). *Organization and Function* [online]. Beijing: China National Space Administration (CNSA). Available at: <<http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771918/index.html>>. Accessed: 27 feb. 2015.

in space operations emerged in the United States in 1983, during the Cold War. when President Ronald Reagan launched the Strategy Defense Initiative, known as ‘Star Wars Program’.

China is also developing capacity for attacking satellites and for cyberwarfare, and continues to be held responsible for a string of cyber-attacks on a number of public and private institutions, even if the Chinese government denies any involvement in cyber-spying campaigns (FRITZ, 2008). It has been as well claimed that Russian security services organized a number of cyberattacks as a part of their cyber-warfare against other countries, even if there is no evidence of official Russian government or military involvement.

On space side, India gains major successes of China. The Indian Space Program began in 1962, and in 1969 New Delhi created the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) within the Department of Atomic Energy (INDIAN SPACE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, 2014). After having put a spacecraft into orbit around Mars in September 2014, India became the first Asian country to reach the red planet. Before India, only the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe had entered Mars orbit: India is member of a club that is more exclusive than the nuclear one. It is also among a limited group of countries that provide commercial satellite launch services. While in 2003 China became the third country to send humans into space, India takes giant steps to send a man into space.

Technical cooperation among IBSA countries is moving forward: in April 2010 South Africa, Brazil and India announced a joint programme to develop satellites (IBSA HEADS OF STATE, 2010). New Delhi’s government considers the India-Brazil a “strategic partnership” (MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, 2010-2011). The IBSA Trilateral Dialogue Forum, a coordinating mechanism amongst three emerging countries, has been established by the *Brasília Declaration* of 6 June 2003, which mentions India, Brazil and South Africa’s condition as “developing nations and their capacity of acting on a global scale as the main reasons for the three countries to come together, as well as their status as middle powers”³⁴. The Dialogue Forum is boosting the economies of

its member countries, as trade between IBSA partners has increased significantly since the Forum’s inception and indications are that the target of 25 USD billion by 2015 will be achieved³⁵. On 1 February 2004 IBSA established a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Defence (IBSA TRILATERAL, 2015), as none of member nations is partner of NATO.

For its part, Brazil is bringing to the other BRICS members the regional cartel of oil-producing countries, united by UNASUR energy program, which aims to “promote cooperation between national oil companies of the member states” (HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, 2007) at every level, through the Energy Council of South America (*Consejo de Energético Suramérica*), composed of the Ministers of Energy, who, according to the *Energy Treaty of South America*, have the task of drawing the guidelines of the South American Energy Strategy³⁶ and of the Action Plan for regional energy integration, which were discussed in the Third Meeting of South American Energy Council (THIRD SOUTH AMERICAN ENERGY COUNCIL, 2012).

The member countries of UNASUR prefer to keep a distance from the U.S. and closer to emerging countries like India, China, and the Arab countries, to establish a multilateral program in international relations (UNASUR, 2011).

6 The Race for a New Global Governance

To certify its position as an emerging power, Brazil wishes to make its entry into the exclusive club of great powers: the UN Security Council (UNSC). The reform of the Security Council requires the agreement of at least two-thirds of UN member states and that of all the permanent members of the UNSC, enjoying the veto right. China, who is a permanent member of the Security Council, endorsed the aspirations of Brazil and India to play bigger roles, while Moscow and Beijing support India’s candidature, according to the 13rd Russia, India, China (RIC) foreign ministers meeting held in Beijing on 2 February

³⁴ IBSA TRILATERAL. *About IBSA Background* [online]. IBSA Trilateral, 2015. Available at: <<http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/about-ibsa/background>>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.

³⁵ IBSA TRILATERAL, *About IBSA background*.

³⁶ UNASUR. *South American Energy Strategy* [pdf]. Quito: Unasur. Available at: <<http://www.unasur.org/images/descargas/ESTATUTOS%20CONSEJOS%20MINISTERIALES%20SECTORIALES/LINEAMIENTOS%20DE%20ESTRATEGIA%20ENERGETICA%20SURAMERICANA.pdf>>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.

2015(FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE RUSSIANS FEDERATION, THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 2015). While endorsing India's aspiration of greatness, China just "attaches great importance to the role of Brazil in international affairs, understands and supports its aspiration of playing a bigger part in the UN" (CHUNYING, 2015).

In the past, Brazil has failed to reach this goal, as Western states dominate international political and security institutions, and "Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate" with "the exclusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries" (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 39).

In an attempt to get a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations "Brazil risked all of its diplomatic history by vetoing the admission of Germany, thereby isolating itself totally from the international scenario" (RODRIGUES; MIALHE, 2013). The Council initially had five permanent seats and four non-permanent, and one of the permanent seats was vacant due to the absence of the United States. The Covenant of the League of Nations expressly provided for the possibility of increasing the number of members of the Board. The Brazilian representative claimed universal League and strengthened its position by stating that Brazil continued in the role of defender of the Latin American countries. After the veto on Germany, Brazil remained in complete isolation and, whereas the next Assembly would change the rules for the selection of temporary members of the Council of the League, the loss of the place that Brazil was given as fact, and the country withdrew from the organization on the 10 July 1926. It was a losing hazard.

IBSA members support their claims each other, and agreed on the urgent need for reforms in the United Nations, especially the Security Council. As Huntington wrote "states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization" (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 35). IBSA nations emphasised the need for urgent reform of the UN Security Council including expansion of permanent and non-permanent categories of its membership, with increased participation of developing countries in both categories (IBSA TRILATERAL, 2015), as the current composition of the UNSC does not "reflect contemporary geopolitical realities" (IBSA TRILATERAL, 2015). This position was reiterated at every IBSA meeting, where

member states have recalled their firm commitment to multilateralism.

In support of its claims to play a leading role in the emerging new world order, Brazil can count on the support of BRICS and IBSA members, who mutually support each other, as well as G-4 members, including, in addition to Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, against whom there is the veto of China for a possible entry into the UN Security Council, in view of the political and historical issues between the two countries. Brazil is the only German strategic partner in Latin America.

Brazil cannot count on the support of all the UNASUR members, as the greatest impediments to its candidacy as permanent member of the UN Security Council are the regional oppositions of Argentina and Mexico (SWART, 2009), who is an observer state of the Union of South American Nations, as well as observer of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Mercosur. Buenos Aires, which doubled its military spending between 2004 and 2013 up to 4511 USD (155 percent growth, equalling 7 per cent of GDP) ((PERLO-FREEMAN; SOLMIRANO, 2014, p. 6), is also a member of Mercosur, and an associate member of The Andean Community.

In March 2007 Brazil and Mexico - influential country in the WTO, in line with Washington's position because of the NAFTA agreement signed in 1992 - established a binational commission to deepen trade relations and cooperation in international issues of regional agenda (MRE, 2007), whereupon the committee has not met since 2008 to autumn 2013, when a meeting was convened to assess the possible collaboration between the respective state oil companies Petrobras and Pemex.

7 The African Winning and Losing Carambole Game

The game to support the Brazilian candidature for a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations, also goes by the African arena, where China is playing a gradually increasing role, and where the African Union (AU) supports New Delhi's candidacy ("Africa takes note of India's position and its aspirations to become a permanent member with full rights in an expanded UN Security Council") (HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AND HEADS OF DELEGATION OF AFRICA, 2008), making of India the only country with

support vote of every member of United Nations except Pakistan (SWART, 2009). South Africa demands permanent African seats in UNSC, too, and is a member of BRICS and IBSA as well.

Brazil, who is a non-Africa state accredited to the AU, is involved in the Continent-to-Continent partnership through the Africa-South America Summit (ASA)³⁷. Other accredited nations, such as Argentina and Mexico, are against the entry of Brazil in the UN Security Council, while others countries are competitors³⁸.

To show himself ready to assume a leading role in global governance, Brazil expanded his ties to the Southern Hemisphere and to the Western Hemisphere, playing a central role in crisis management, humanitarian aid and disaster relief in Haiti, Mozambique, Angola and East Timor. Actually, the Brazilian military are deployed in Lebanon (UNIFIL MTF), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), South Sudan (UNMISS) (UNITED NATIONS, 2015). Through 'peace diplomacy' Brazil is redefining its strategic focus to encompass the South Atlantic. This global commitment makes Brazil one of the twenty top contributors to United Nations peacekeeping missions, with a total of 33 participations. Brazil is also the tenth largest contributor to the United Nations regular budget, with a net contribution of 38 USD million for the 2012 Assessment (UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, 2011).

As a member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*), Brazil, thanks to the 'cultural diplomacy', extends its influence to the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, the continent which sees the awkward presence of China. In 2013 Chinese Deputy President Temer attended the opening ceremony of the 10th anniversary of the Forum on Trade and Economic Cooperation Between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries and its fourth Ministerial Conference in Macao, which was the

last Portuguese overseas territory to be decolonized, and returned to China in 1999.

The cooperation with Brazil and other Portuguese-speaking nations, a 267 million people community, located across the globe but having cultural similarities and a shared history, through joint-collaborations in the framework of CPLP, include military cooperation, financial aid, and cultural exchange. Through successive enlargements, the Union has grown from the seven founding states - Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe - to the current nine, with the self-determination of Timor-Leste in 2002 and the accession of Equatorial Guinea in 2014. Brazil is also strongly committed in the development and restoration of peace in East Timor, where it has a very powerful influence (the little state-island has its own only South American diplomatic mission in Brasília).

Mauritius, Senegal, Georgia, Japan, Namibia and Turkey has been admitted to CPLP with the status of Associate Observers (COMMUNITY OF PORTUGUESE SPEAKING COUNTRIES, 2015). Japan, who claims a seat in the UNSC, and supports Western initiatives within the WTO, has had historical contacts with the Portuguese language in the 16th and 17th century, and today has connections to the Lusophone world through Japanese Brazilians in Brazil and Japan.

The influence of Brazil in Africa also passes through the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which encompasses 14 countries of the South of Africa, including two members of the CPLP (Angola and Mozambique), and South Africa (SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, 2012), a strategic ally in BRICS and IBSA.

Angola, along with São Tomé and Príncipe, is also a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) (ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES, 2014), while Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau are among the 15 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among them the influential Nigeria, which guests the headquarters of the organization. Brazil is among ECOWAS partners, along with other strategic allies: Germany (G-4), China (BRICS) and India (G-4, BRICS and IBSA) (ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, 2015), the latter in the lead for a seat in a reformed UN Security Council. France, United States and Venezuela complete the group of partner countries of ECOWAS.

³⁷ AFRICAN UNION. *The Africa-South America Summit (ASA)* [online]. Addis Ababa: African Union. Available at: <http://au.int/en/partnerships/africa_southamerica>. Accessed: 1 mar. 2015.

³⁸ AFRICAN UNION. *Non-Africa States & Regional Integration & International Organizations Accredited to the AU* [online]. Addis Ababa: African Union. Available at: <<http://au.int/en/partnerships/others>>. Accessed: 1 mar. 2015.

Besides its involvement in peace and security on Africa, Brazil is extending his influence in the continent through the bilateral relations, as the Nigeria-Brazil bilateral commission established in 2013. Nigeria is a member of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 12 oil-exporting developing nations which counts among its members two South American allies of Brazil (Ecuador and Venezuela, a partner of ECOWAS, as well) and a member state of the CPLP (Angola) (ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, 2015).

The action of Brasília in Africa, where India's influence is strongest, also for reasons of geography, as well as political and economic, goes through a kind of 'strategy of billiards', establishing a series of direct relations involving indirectly other countries, playing a 'carambole game'.

8 The Competition on Global Events

The policy of Brazil, to establish itself as a world power, also affects the ability of being able to obtain commitment for organizing global events. Events like the Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup, or the Expo, demonstrate not only the ability to build political relationships on a global scale, and the success of the foreign policy of the country, but also the possibility of having a worldwide showcase for show off its economic successes.

The competition between 'emerging middle powers' is also held on the sporting side: Brazil hosted the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and will host the XXXI Summer Olympic Games in 2016. The commitment of Brasília for the organization of these world sports events has caused some controversy, because of the high costs borne by public finances, even if the indicator of population living below the national poverty line decreased from 21 percent in 2005 to 8.9 percent in 2013 (GLOBAL POVERTY WORKING GROUP, 2015).

The allocation process of the FIFA World Cup 2014, which is performed by the FIFA's Executive Committee, for the policy of rotation, however, was to take place in South America. Brazil, which had already hosted the World Cup football in 1950, enjoyed the support of CONMEBOL (the South American Football Confederation), with 10 member football associations, and was the only candidate to host the event (FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, 2007). The Brazilian World Cup 2014 has been the first to be held in South America

since the 1978 FIFA World Cup in Argentina.

The importance of these events has been highlighted by the IBSA members, which "recognized that hosting these events reflects the positive momentum of developing countries" as "they are potentially a tool for their social and economic development" (IBSA HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT, 2015, p. 10). The alliance has allowed to other partners to achieve their goals: FIFA 2010 World Cup in South Africa and 2010 Commonwealth Games in New Delhi.

In addition to these events, in 2011 the city of São Paulo was a candidate to host the Expo 2020, but the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE), the intergovernmental organization in charge of overseeing and regulating World Expos, chose Dubai (UAE). If we analyze the result of the vote, we note that the first round United Arab Emirates got 77 ballots, Russia got 39, and Turkey took 33 votes, while Brazil got only 13 preferences, and was excluded from the second and from the third and last voting (BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DES EXPOSITIONS, 2013): this means that Brazil does not have the full support of many developing countries, which is credited.

The fact that Russia was a competitor of Brazil, and the latter has collected only a third of the votes in Moscow, confirms that the South American country gains in international prestige only when supported unconditionally by all the other nations with which it has strategic alliances (Russia is a strategic partner of Brazil in the BRICS group). In fact, in the allocation of the Thirty-first Olympic Games, Rio de Janeiro was awarded the organization of the event only at the last vote. While Madrid on the first ballot had passed Rio 28-26, with Tokyo third at 22, and Chicago at 18, on the second ballot Rio jumped to first place with 46 preferences, followed by Madrid at 29, and the Asian city at last place with 20 votes (INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, 2010). The *cariocas* earned the votes of the countries that supported the United States, which have significant economic interests in Brazil. The last vote, Rio got the better, dubbing the Spanish capital 66-32, thanks to the convergence of the nations that supported Japan, strategic ally of Brazil in the G-4.

Sport is a great promotional vehicle for the image of the country, and Brazil, in addition to football and other minor sports, boasts a remarkable tradition of Formula 1 drivers (31), among which stand out for popularity the three-time world champions Nelson Piquet and

Ayrton Senna, the two-time world champion Emerson Fittipaldi, Rubens Barrichello, and Felipe Massa.

9 Conclusions

Brazilian foreign policy is characterized by multilateralism, and by the establishment and the membership in many international organizations and coordination mechanisms. Where there is no direct, Brasília extends its relations with a 'winning and losing carambole game'. Brazil has formed an alliance with all countries that support the need for reform of global governance, starting with the UN and its Security Council, including WTO, FMI and World Bank, leading the protest of developing countries against the Western conservatism of international institutions.

Brazil has implemented a regional strategy, as well as a global one, to earn a place among the most influential nations in the world: an exclusive club, which not only takes into account the economic wealth and population of the country, but also military power - especially nuclear deterrence power -, space power, and other variables as technological power.

While the leadership in Latin America is out of the question, without prejudice to the position of Argentina and Mexico, the global one is threatened by India, which has a much more dense network of relationships, and counts on the support of all the nations, excluding Pakistan. New Delhi has an undisputed superiority in military, technology - including the space program - and is a member of the exclusive club of nuclear powers.

Despite its multilateral economic relations, the Brazilian economy is overly dependent on exports to the United States, European Union, China, and India, in order to overcome the latter in the race for a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council, which certifies the achievement of 'superpower' status. In an effort to carve out a leading role in the emerging new world order, Brazil exerts its soft power to ensure international security: from humanitarian aid to assistance in state and nation building. In the background is the specter of failure in 1926, when Brazil was played around for a seat in the Council of the League of Nations, and ended up being forced to leave the organization. This time the Brazilian multilateral strategy must be a 'winning hazard'.

The strategy of Brasília to come out of the 'always emerging' powers, involves huge costs, because of the ambitious military and space programs. The current economic situation, which, after many years of growth, marked a setback, along with the enormous social inequalities anchors in the country, advise against continuing along this path. Brazilian policymakers, however, do not seem willing to give up dreams of grandeur, too long chased.

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