Judicial Anarchism and Legal Certainty
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5102/rbpp.v5i2.3270Keywords:
Judiciary, Judicial Anarchism, Legal Certainty, Legal Capital, Principal-AgentAbstract
By interpreting legal certainty as a form of capital, the legal capital, the social consequences of the absence of coordination mechanisms between judges to create and maintain the law is analyzed, specially the resulting judicial anarchism. A principal-agent model indicates that Brazilian judges do not have enough incentives and mechanisms to invest in legal capi-tal and to unify legal rules. The resulting legal uncertainty generates incentives for the overexploitation of courts, hence, the endemic problem of court congestion.References
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